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ABSTRACT
Justice John Paul Stevens retired from the Supreme Court almost
a decade ago and turned ninety-eight years old in April 2018. How
should we remember his legacy on the Supreme Court? This Article
places his legacy within his election law jurisprudence. Specifically,
Justice Stevens provided a consistent theory, which we term “im-
partial governance,” that has had a lasting impact on the field.
This theory undergirds Justice Stevens’s creation of the important
Anderson-Burdick-Crawford balancing test that federal courts use
to construe the constitutionality of laws that impact the right to
vote, such as voter ID laws. It is part of his important opinions on
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redistricting, which are now gaining steam in the current debate over
partisan gerrymandering. It animates his opinions on campaign
finance law. And it explains his dissent in Bush v. Gore, arguably
the most controversial case to reach the Court. Impartial governance
surely stems from Justice Stevens’s own personal history, where he
witnessed his father deal with the criminal justice system, clerked for
liberal Justice Wiley Rutledge, and served as a moderate Republican
battling corrupt Chicago political machines. This Article recounts
that history and highlights how it impacted his election law juris-
prudence, with an Appendix summarizing each of Justice Stevens’s
sixty-seven election law opinions. As we reflect on his life and career,
these insights into Justice Stevens’s impartial governance theory of
election law will help scholars, the media, and the public understand
his enduring legacy.
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INTRODUCTION
President Gerald Ford has not posthumously convinced historians
of his lasting legacy on American democracy.1 After all, voters never
even placed President Ford in the Oval Office. He “accidental[ly]”
inherited the responsibility following an unprecedented double res-
ignation.2 Then, after a mere two years, he lost his election bid when
voters handed the presidency to Jimmy Carter. “I’m a Ford not a
Lincoln,” Ford humbly quipped.3 Surely history would remember
him as such. Yet on November 28, 1975, President Ford made one
decision that has had an oft-overlooked impact on American de-
mocracy: he nominated John Paul Stevens to the United States
Supreme Court.4 Just as history has minimized President Ford’s
political importance, legal minds have not yet settled on how best
to memorialize Justice Stevens’s contributions to the Court. Ironic-
ally, then, history may best remember John Paul Stevens—the
Justice nominated by the man who never even won a presidential
election—through the lens of his election law jurisprudence.
Supreme Court appointments can be a president’s most lasting
legacy.5 In 1975, however, many commentators thought that John
Paul Stevens might prove an exception. “Ford’s purpose was not to
make a big splash and change the world,” Professor Jack Balkin
suggested.6 The nomination did not spark remarkable controversy.
Beforehand, some observers believed that President Ford would
copy President Richard Nixon’s precedent and nominate a candidate
1. E.g., John Robert Greene, Gerald Ford: Impact and Legacy, MILLER CTR. PUB. AFFAIRS,
http://millercenter.org/president/biography/ford-impact-and-legacy#contributor [https://perma.
cc/6XAY-NZR7].
2. Paul Maidment, Gerald Ford: The Accidental President, FORBES (Dec. 27, 2006,
2:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2006/12/27/notes-on-the-news-ford-biz-cx_pm_1227ford.html
[https://perma.cc/E97A-FYHD].
3. Id.
4. When Ford Nominated John Paul Stevens, TIME (Dec. 8, 1975), http://content.time.
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,947575,00.html [https://perma.cc/H9BE-VNR3].
5. See, e.g., Edward White, Presidential Appointments and the Lasting Legacy of the
Federal Judiciary, AM. CTR. FOR L. & JUST. (Aug. 11, 2016), https://aclj.org/supreme-court/
presidential-appointments-and-the-lasting-legacy-of-the-federal-judiciary [https://perma.cc/
N8SD-7ZTE].
6. Jeffrey Toobin, After Stevens, NEW YORKER (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2010/03/22/after-stevens [https://perma.cc/HMX6-EVE2].
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who would push the Court further right.7 Instead, Stevens repre-
sented a “maverick.”8 “There was no attempt to nominate a strong
ideologue.... [Ford] wanted a straight-arrow, middle-of-the-road, nor-
mal guy, excellent lawyer—and that’s what they got in Stevens,”
Balkin reflected.9 Court-watchers predicted that Stevens would join
Justices Lewis Powell and Byron White at the Court’s ideological
center as swing votes.10 The stakes of adding another centrist at
that time did not seem that high. Accordingly, observers thought
that Justice Stevens would play only a small role in the Court’s deci-
sion-making process.11 Yet Justice Stevens found himself “in the un-
expected position of shaping the [C]ourt’s liberal jurisprudence.”12
Many Supreme Court Justices have developed well-known lega-
cies within certain legal fields. “What is a legacy? It’s planting seeds
in a garden you never get to see.”13 A Supreme Court Justice’s leg-
acy is meaningful because it helps to place that Justice within the
context of the history that faced the Court while the Justice served.
A legacy tells us something important about how that Justice in-
fluenced legal doctrine, both while the Justice served and beyond.14
Chief Justice Earl Warren oversaw a busy Court that churned out
groundbreaking civil rights precedents,15 while his successor Chief
7. See When Ford Nominated John Paul Stevens, supra note 4.
8. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Rehnquist’s Court: Tuning Out the White House, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/11/magazine/rehnquist-s-court-tuning-out-
the-white-house.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/88NB-JTDZ] (quoting Justice Harry
Blackmun). 
9. Toobin, supra note 6.
10. David G. Savage, John Paul Stevens’ Unexpectedly Liberal Legacy, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 9, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/09/nation/la-na-stevenslegacy10-2010apr10
[https://perma.cc/7V7V-RPN3].
11. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html [https://perma.cc/CC93-
5BTC].
12. Id.
13. LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, The World Was Wide Enough, on HAMILTON: AN AMERICAN
MUSICAL (Atl. Records 2015).
14. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Justice Scalia’s Legacies, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 221, 231
(2017) (“The potential legacies, which all Supreme Court justices may try to shape, are (1) the
labels or characterizations that follow them into history; (2) their writing styles; (3) their
substantive impact on the Court's jurisprudence; (4) their temperament, particularly how
their fellow justices viewed them as colleagues; and (5) their methodologies or approaches to
questions of constitutional law.”).
15. See Bruce Mirken, Earl Warren, John F. Kennedy and Civil Rights, GREENLINING
INST. (Nov. 8, 2013), http://greenlining.org/blog/2013/earl-warren-john-f-kennedy-civil-rights/
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Justice Warren Burger scaled back the Court’s activism through
equally seminal—albeit more conservative—opinions.16 More re-
cently, Justice Anthony Kennedy has authored every majority
opinion expanding the rights of same-sex couples over the last
thirty years.17 Justice Antonin Scalia pioneered a school of juris-
prudence on originalism that has dominated legal circles on both the
left and right.18
Yet historians and legal academics alike have yet to agree on
Justice John Paul Stevens’s legacy.19 Some have described Justice
Stevens’s impact as “unexpectedly liberal,” without much more.20
Others have stated that, while having “[u]nquestionable [i]ntegrity,”
Justice Stevens exercised “[q]uestionable [l]egal [j]udgment” during
his long jurisprudential career.21 One scholar looked at his pro-
lificacy, particularly in writing dissents.22 Overall, Justice Stevens
has received a “[m]ixed [v]erdict.”23 These disparities show that,
[https://perma.cc/3GDT-KYZ3].
16. See Justin Driver, Just How Rightward-Leaning Was the Burger Supreme Court?,
WASH. POST (June 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/just-how-rightward-
leaning-was-the-burger-supreme-court/2016/06/17/4c722b8e-2b65-11e6-9de3-6e6e7a14000c_
story.html?utm_term=.cf01d7b77c8a [https://perma.cc/MBY5-GCFD].
17. See Joan Biskupic, Anthony Kennedy Legacy Again at Play in Same-Sex Marriage
Case, CNN (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/05/politics/anthony-kennedy-supreme-
court-same-sex-marriage-religious-liberty/index.html [https://perma.cc/K2DV-YBGL]. But see
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727-29, 1732
(2018) (holding, in an opinion that Justice Kennedy wrote, that the Colorado Commission’s
procedure in this specific case, ultimately requiring a bakery to make a cake for a same-sex
wedding, violated the Free Exercise Clause).
18. See, e.g., ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:
A DEBATE 95, 101-03 (2011). 
19. See Lindsay S. Dunbar & John B. Meixner, Foreword: The Legacy of Justice John Paul
Stevens, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 409, 409 (2012) (introducing the symposium issue on Justice
Stevens’s legacy and noting that the articles include discussion of his “executive power
jurisprudence, his interpretation of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment, his trajectory on the Court, and finally his interpretive methods”).
20. See Savage, supra note 10.
21. Ilya Shapiro, Justice Stevens’ Legacy: Unquestionable Integrity, Questionable Legal
Judgment, CATO INST. (Apr. 9, 2010, 11:44 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/justice-stevens-
legacy-unquestionable-integrity-questionable-legal-judgment [https://perma.cc/MY9H-EMY3].
22. See Craig D. Rust, The Leadership Legacy of Justice John Paul Stevens, 2 J.L. 135, 137
(2012) (“Stevens led by example, prolifically recording his own thoughts on the law and
allowing them to influence generations of jurists and scholars, though his position may not
have won the day or even garnered much support among his colleagues, initially.”).
23. Richard A. Epstein, The Stevens Legacy: Mixed Verdict, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2010,
4:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2010/04/10/john-paul-stevens-supreme-court-law-opinions-
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almost a decade after his retirement, few scholars have noted a set-
tled legacy for Justice Stevens.
Undoubtedly, Justice Stevens authored landmark decisions. In
FCC v. Pacifica, a case stemming from comedian George Carlin’s
famous “Filthy Words” sketch, Stevens wrote the majority opinion
giving the Federal Communications Commission the authority to
regulate indecency over the airwaves.24 He set down an important
precedent for copyright law in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., the “Betamax” case.25 Justice Stevens expanded
the government’s power to invoke its eminent domain authority in
Kelo v. City of New London.26 In perhaps the most important case
for Administrative Law, he created the well-known Chevron two-
step process for reviewing agency decisions.27
Yet, although these precedents are important in their respective
areas, scholars do not generally credit Justice Stevens with an
outsized role in any of these fields. But scholars should recognize
Justice Stevens for his election law jurisprudence. In a series of
cases involving the law of democracy, Justice Stevens espoused a
consistent theory that greatly influenced a newly formed field. His
jurisprudence deeply affected the Court’s approach to election law,
embracing the Court’s plunge into the political thicket and even
more directly inserting judges into the most controversial disputes
surrounding our democracy. He ultimately trusted judges to resolve
issues involving elections with disinterested impartiality, moving
the judiciary deep into the political thicket. Good or bad, no one can
deny the significance of this transformation. Given the increasing
importance of election law cases to the operation of our democratic
system, this utmost trust of judges to resolve election law disputes
fairly and impartially comprises a previously unrecognized legacy.
Justice Stevens was a devotee of sovereign impartiality, or the
notion that governments should serve the people with total neu-
trality.28 Yet Justice Stevens also recognized the breathing room
columnists-richard-a-epstein.html [https://perma.cc/KGP4-QB2Q].
24. 438 U.S. 726, 729, 738 (1978).
25. 464 U.S. 417, 454-56 (1984).
26. 545 U.S. 469, 488-90 (2005).
27. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
28. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens and Equally Impartial Government,
43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 885, 890 (2010) (“[Justice Stevens] worked within the ... framework of
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that governments require to function properly, particularly in ad-
ministering elections. Seeing these two conflicting thoughts, Justice
Stevens removed election law from the world of strict scrutiny and
harsh lines. Instead, he planted the jurisprudential flag squarely in
the land of pragmatic realism and balancing tests, with judges
playing the largest role. These two strands continue to play tug-of-
war in election law cases today.
During his long tenure, Justice Stevens authored sixty-seven
opinions—majority, plurality, concurring, or dissenting—dealing
with the relationship between law and democracy,29 surely repre-
senting more election law writing than any other Justice.30 At times,
the Justice’s thoughts moved the field. His opinions in Anderson v.
Celebrezze31 and Crawford v. Marion County Election Board32 set
forth the test, invoked frequently, for weighing burdens on the right
to vote when states administer elections. Given the ongoing litiga-
tion over voter identification laws and other election administra-
tion issues, the way Justice Stevens shaped the doctrine continues
to have crucial relevance today.33 The Justice also wrote fierce dis-
sents. He opposed the Court’s inaction regarding political gerryman-
ders,34 and he deplored the diluvial impact Citizens United v. FEC
would have on money in politics.35 Justice Stevens also took great
umbrage at the favoritism he believed legislators showered on the
an equally impartial government.”).
29. See the Appendix for a summary of each case. We included all cases involving election
administration, redistricting, ballot access, and campaign finance in this count. We did not
include cases involving union elections or those that had only an incidental connection to the
electoral system.
30. We searched the records of other Justices with long tenures on the Court—such as
Justice Douglas and Justice Kennedy—but did not find as many election law opinions.
31. 460 U.S. 782, 788 (1983).
32. 553 U.S. 181, 185, 190 (2008).
33. E.g., Ann E. Marimow & Rachel Weiner, Appeals Court Upholds Virginia’s Voter-
ID Law, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/
appeals-court-upholds-virginias-voter-id-law/2016/12/13/3888f46e-c150-11e6-9a51-cd56ea1c
2bb7_story.html [https://perma.cc/5MN3-HCFR].
34. E.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 323 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding
that political gerrymanders presented a justiciable—and pernicious—issue). 
35. 558 U.S. 310, 393-94 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.
ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php [https://perma.cc/GU69-
B5C4] (showing an increase in total independent expenditures since 2010).
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two-party system.36 Although dissents do not say what the law is,
they can nonetheless gain momentum with “the shifting tides of
history.”37
Justice Stevens strongly believed that American politics operated
best when judges could ensure that the system served the citizens
impartially. Mapmakers should draw lines fairly without regard to
party politics. Congress and state governments should ensure an
even electoral playing field through reasonable campaign finance
restrictions. Finally, state officials must count ballots fairly and im-
partially. That said, state governments also needed deference to
operate the electoral machine smoothly. For instance, with suffi-
cient justification, states could enact voter identification laws to
combat actual or perceived fraud.38 Justice Stevens reconciled these
competing ideas through his pragmatic realism. It was up to the
courts, the ultimate neutral arbiters, to ensure that political actors
conducted the machinery of democracy impartially.
To be sure, one might see weaknesses in Justice Stevens’s elec-
tion law jurisprudence. First, he often failed to secure five votes
and instead frequently wrote in dissent.39 But this fact might
demonstrate that he tried to remain consistent with his own theory
of impartial governance, regardless of shifting Supreme Court ma-
jorities. His dissents generally came in cases in which he believed
the Court had not sufficiently protected democratic (small “d”)
impartiality.40 Moreover, some of the seeds that Justice Stevens
planted with these dissents have started to bloom.
Second, “impartial governance” might seem malleable, allowing
a justice to impart his or her own views into a case. Other members
36. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 370 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
37. See David Cole, The Power of a Supreme Court Dissent, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-power-of-a-supreme-court-dissent/2015/10/
29/fbc80acc-66cb-11e5-8325-a42b5a459b1e_story.html?utm_term=.08868de69227 [https://
perma.cc/ZP6A-4C3D]. In the most obvious example, John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), set the stage for Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
38. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203-04 (2008).
39. See Nina Totenberg, For Decades, Stevens Molded High Court Rulings, NPR (Apr. 9,
2010, 11:50 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123075821 [https://
perma.cc/KM7Q-M579].
40. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 323 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of the Court also sometimes rested on seemingly amorphous con-
cepts of fairness and justice, so one might say that Justice Stevens
was not unique in this regard.41 But Justice Stevens was parti-
cularly consistent and prolific in explicitly embracing this theory
throughout his election law jurisprudence.42 The Justice trusted
judges to rule impartially—irrespective of their own political be-
liefs—and he believed that democracy would flourish with impar-
tial election rules, especially if judges served as a backstop to police
partisan overreaches. That is, there were multiple levels of impar-
tiality to reach impartial governance: an impartial judiciary that
would craft rules to ensure impartial elections. Through it all,
Justice Stevens espoused an unwavering faith in judges to rule im-
partially in the most partisan, contentious cases the judiciary con-
siders, thereby elevating the importance of the courts in securing
fairness for our democratic processes. One might say, then, that
Justice Stevens’s true legacy was in trusting the judiciary to foster
a fair democracy.
Third, one might think that Justice Stevens’s approach has done
more harm than good, especially in opening the door to increasingly
strict voter identification laws and giving states too much deference
to enact election rules that have a partisan effect. Surely Justice
Stevens himself thought that his approach would root out this
partisanship, though it required judges themselves to be impartial
and to apply it scrupulously. This Article, however, takes no position
on whether Justice Stevens was ultimately correct in the test that
he espoused. Instead, it focuses on the significance of that test for
the development of the field.
Justice Stevens left his mark on election law in a subtle way, one
that “defies categorization in either traditional ‘liberal’ or ‘conserva-
tive’ terms.”43 The briar-filled thicket known as election law has
41. See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court’s Diversity Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/24/opinion/the-supreme-courts-diversity-dilemma.
html [https://perma.cc/5FFK-BVL3].
42. See Scott Lemieux, Why Clarence Thomas’s Rulings on Race Are So Idiosyncratic, NEW
REPUBLIC (May 23, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/142825/clarence-thomass-rulings-
race-idiosyncratic [https://perma.cc/PEF9-74E6] (describing Justice Stevens as one of the
“most idiosyncratic Supreme Court justices of the last 40 years, the most likely to stake out
a unique position on a particular issue”).
43. See Pamela S. Karlan, Cousins’ Kin: Justice Stevens and Voting Rights, 27 RUTGERS
L.J. 521, 527 (1996).
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frustrated justices (and even broken a few others, literally harming
their health).44 Yet Justice Stevens had the tenacity to outline
consistently an enduring theory of democracy. As Professor Pamela
Karlan noted:
Throughout his judicial career, Justice Stevens has offered an
unorthodox answer to the question of when the Constitution
should apply to upset the results of the political regulation of
politics. But ultimately, his resolution of the issue—that judicial
intervention is proper only when the majority acts with the sole
purpose of curtailing the political strength of the minority or
when Congress has directed the courts to oversee state electoral
processes—reflects both greater doctrinal coherence and more
common sense than its prevailing competitors.45
Some of Justice Stevens’s opinions delivered prophetic fire and
brimstone to the injustice that he saw in political entrenchment.
Other writings granted states more deference to administer even-
handed elections. Overall, however, the Justice emphatically did
not show “partial[ity] to the wicked or ... deprive the righteous of
justice.”46 Instead, he promoted a way to secure what he viewed to
be the most fair and just electoral process. He did so by crafting the
pragmatic balancing tests still used today, with judges at the
forefront of protecting fairness within the political process. As le-
gal scholars continue to navigate this thorn-filled thicket, they can
thank Justice Stevens for tirelessly working to “mak[e] the rough
places smooth.”47
This Article explores the influence John Paul Stevens has had on
election law and explains why history should remember Justice
Stevens for his jurisprudence regarding the law of democracy. Part
I traces the history of the Court’s election law jurisprudence.
Election law has evolved greatly from the days when the Court
adamantly avoided the “political thicket”48 to the modern era, when
the Court’s decision in a contested presidential election essentially
44. See More Perfect—The Political Thicket, RADIOLAB (June 10, 2016), http://radiolab.
org/story/the_political_thicket/ [https://perma.cc/763L-CYC2].
45. Karlan, supra note 43, at 541.
46. Proverbs 18:5.
47. See NW. UNIV., REPORT OF THE JOHN EVANS STUDY COMMITTEE 23 (2014).
48. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
346 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:335
determined the winner.49 Part II examines Justice Stevens’s back-
ground, highlighting aspects of his biography that likely influenced
his jurisprudence in this area. In particular, three formative events
probably shaped Justice Stevens’s views on law and democracy: his
father’s experience with the Illinois justice system, his clerkship
under liberal Justice Wiley Rutledge, and his experience as a
moderate Republican battling corrupt Chicago political machines.
Part III argues that Justice Stevens established his legacy within
election law. In particular, this Part explains how Justice Stevens’s
legacy centers on a pragmatic theory of impartial governance that
trusts the judiciary to resolve election law disputes. Most impor-
tantly, Justice Stevens created a balancing test for courts to use
when weighing the individual right to vote with a state’s need to
administer its elections. In addition to this extremely important
development for election administration, Justice Stevens also au-
thored significant opinions involving legislative districting, cam-
paign finance, and the resolution of a presidential election. Overall,
Justice Stevens’s contributions to the nexus between law and
democracy collectively establish his legacy within election law.
I. THICKETS AND THORNS: THE EVOLUTION OF ELECTION LAW
When scholars consider John Paul Stevens, election law may not
immediately spring to mind. He wrote several high-profile decisions
in a variety of fields throughout his tenure.50 And when one thinks
about which justices were most influential for election law, Stevens
may not be the first name to come up. After all, several other giants
have written extensively in the field. Early on, Justices Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter argued against judicial in-
tervention in “political” matters.51 Later, Chief Justice Earl Warren
and Justice William Brennan championed the federal judiciary as
49. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110-11 (2000) (reversing the recount ordered
by the Supreme Court of Florida, effectively making George W. Bush President of the United
States).
50. See Notable Case Opinions by John Paul Stevens, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 10, 2010), http://
archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/04/10/notable_case_opinions_by_
john_paul_stevens/ [https://perma.cc/63R8-GZE4].
51. E.g., Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 550, 552, 556; Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 482, 488
(1903).
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the defender of voting rights.52 More recently, Justice Anthony
Kennedy explored a First Amendment approach to partisan gerry-
mandering53 and was otherwise thought of as the swing vote in
cases involving redistricting and campaign finance.54 So why should
we remember Justice Stevens in this field? Election law has frus-
trated many justices given its obvious political overtones.55 Not John
Paul Stevens. Instead, Justice Stevens laid out a coherent demo-
cratic theory over his nearly thirty-five year tenure, one which can
now define his legacy.
This conclusion may be ironic considering that for nearly two
centuries the Supreme Court avoided “political” cases altogether.56
The modern American can scarcely remember the time when law
and elections didn’t mix. Headlines today prominently feature litiga-
tion over voter identification laws57 and politically gerrymandered
maps.58 In the 2015-16 term alone, the Supreme Court heard cases
about redistricting principles and the First Amendment,59 the “one
52. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563, 566 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
209-10 (1962).
53. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 315-16 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
54. See Andrew Chung, Justice Kennedy on Hot Seat in Major Voting Rights Case,
REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2017, 10:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-election/
justice-kennedy-on-hot-seat-in-major-voting-rights-case-idUSKCN1C81P2 [https://perma.cc/
YB3A-NWMU]; Colin Dwyer, A Brief History of Anthony Kennedy’s Swing Vote—And the
Landmark Cases it Swayed, NPR (June 27, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/27/
623943443/a-brief-history-of-anthony-kennedys-swing-vote-and-the-landmark-cases-it-swayed
[https://perma.cc/SW6P-8CBA]. Given Justice Kennedy’s retirement, it appears that Chief
Justice Roberts will now take Justice Kennedy’s place as the “swing vote” in election law and
other cases.
55. For instance, during the oral argument in Gill v. Whitford about partisan
gerrymandering, Chief Justice Roberts lamented that, if the Court ruled on the merits in the
case, then the public would view the Court as choosing one political party over another.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2018) (No. 16-1161)
(“[T]he intelligent man on the street is going to say that’s a bunch of baloney. It must be
because the Supreme Court preferred the Democrats over the Republicans. And that’s going
to come out one case after another as these cases are brought in every state.”).
56. See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
57. E.g., Marimow & Weiner, supra note 33.
58. Ian Millhiser, One of the Biggest Legal Guns in the Country is Coming for Partisan
Gerrymandering, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 4, 2017, 5:24 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/one-of-
the-biggest-legal-guns-in-the-country-is-coming-for-partisan-gerrymandering-4e6d3a0385fe#.
fpbscg75m [https://perma.cc/8HL2-3MRH].
59. Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 453, 456 (2015).
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person, one vote” doctrine,60 and political corruption.61 The 2016-17
term included two important cases on racial gerrymandering.62 And
the 2017-18 term saw redistricting cases from Texas, Maryland, and
Wisconsin—years after the 2011 round of redistricting.63 The sun
has definitively set on the days when the Supreme Court hesitated
to enter the “political thicket.”64
Yet not so long ago, the Court declined to even hear such cases.
In 1903, the Court in Giles v. Harris kept the Supreme Court out of
the “political thicket.”65 An African American citizen brought suit
against Alabama election officers, alleging that “the great mass of
the white population intends to keep the blacks from voting.”66
Despite the strength of the plaintiff ’s claim that African Americans
suffered significant disenfranchisement because of the new suf-
frage rules of the 1901 Alabama Constitution, the Court dismissed
the case.67 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that “relief from a
great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a State
and the State itself, must be given by them or by the legislative and
political department of the government of the United States.”68
Political questions required action from the political branches, not
the judiciary.69
60. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016).
61. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2361-62 (2016).
62. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794 (2017).
63. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) (Texas); Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942
(2018) (per curiam) (Maryland); Gill v Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (Wisconsin).
64. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (“Courts ought not to enter this political
thicket.”).
65. 189 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1903); see also Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy,
and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 297-98, 317 (2000) (discussing the importance of
Giles in stymieing American democracy).
66. Giles, 189 U.S. at 482, 488.
67. Id. at 488.
68. Id.
69. Id. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall famously proclaimed that “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Yet the Chief also noted that when “the executive possesses a
constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are
only politically examinable.” Id. at 166. Accordingly, “[s]ometimes ... the law is that the
judicial department has no business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness—because the
question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no judicially enforceable
rights.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004). This justiciability concept is known as
the “political question doctrine.” JOHN E. FINN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 55
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Justice Felix Frankfurter similarly championed this conservative
ideology. Four decades after Giles, Illinois voters brought a claim
against state government officials essentially seeking “to recon-
struct the electoral process of Illinois in order that it may be ad-
equately represented in the councils of the Nation.”70 The voters
argued that the current Illinois districting plan featured widely dis-
proportionate districts, resulting in diluted votes in those areas with
higher population density.71 Once again, the Court counseled a
political—rather than legal—solution.72 Writing for a plurality of
the Court in Colgrove v. Green, Justice Frankfurter famously de-
clared: “Courts ought not to enter this political thicket.”73 After all,
“[t]he Constitution has left the performance of many duties in our
governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and
legislative action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in
exercising their political rights.”74 Having federal courts reorder
political maps would “defeat the vital political principle which led
Congress, more than a hundred years ago, to require districting.”75
The judiciary best fostered democratic principles not through “af-
firmatively re-map[ping] ... districts so as to bring them more in con-
formity with the standards of fairness for a representative system”
but rather through nonintervention.76 In fact, Justice Frankfurter
later wrote: “In the day-to-day working of our democracy it is vital
that the power of the non-democratic organ of our Government be
exercised with rigorous self-restraint.”77 Justice Frankfurter feared
that a Supreme Court engaged in political decisions would morph
into a political branch—without the requisite political checks-and-
(2006). In essence, “the political question doctrine [holds that] some questions, in their nature,
are fundamentally political, and not legal, and if a question is fundamentally political ... then
the court will refuse to hear that case. It will claim that it doesn’t have jurisdiction. And it will
leave that question to some other aspect of the political process to settle out.” Id.
70. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946).
71. Id. at 550-51.
72. Id. at 556 (“The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that
will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress.”).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 553.
76. Id.
77. Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 555 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
350 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:335
balances. For a period, his philosophy of self-restraint in election
law cases won the day.
This self-restraint disappeared, however, in Baker v. Carr.78 This
monumental redistricting case plunged the Supreme Court straight
into the heart of the political briar patch. In Baker, several plain-
tiffs argued that a decades-old apportionment plan, which the State
of Tennessee had not updated despite population shifts, diluted
their right to vote and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.79 The lower federal court had dismis-
sed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.80 It held that po-
litical law—particularly legislative redistricting—simply did not
present a justiciable issue.81 After all, as Justice Frankfurter noted
in his dissent in this case, the Supreme Court had said as much in
“a uniform course of decision established by a dozen cases.”82 Baker
did not appear any different from those cases.
Yet the Supreme Court suddenly changed course. National
attitudes had shifted dramatically since Colegrove.83 The political
process repeatedly failed to redress the election-related ills that
cases such as Giles and Colegrove had exposed. After all, “[e]n-
trenched politicians had no incentive to alter the district lines and
governors and state courts refused to intervene.”84 In 1958, then-
Senator John F. Kennedy assailed this failure as the “Shame of the
States.”85 Then, just three months before the Court heard oral
argument in Baker, CBS aired a television broadcast that devoted
significant attention to malapportionment.86 Attorneys for the plain-
tiffs in Baker pressed the issue as a “voting rights case” needing ju-
dicial intervention.87 “[T]here exist[s] no judicial no-man’s-land in
connection with constitutional rights of individual[s under] the
78. 369 U.S. 186, 217-18 (1962).
79. Id. at 187-95.
80. Id. at 188.
81. Id. at 208-09.
82. Id. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
83. Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reynolds Reconsidered, 67 ALA. L. REV.
485, 497 (2015).
84. Id. at 493.
85. John F. Kennedy, The Shame of the States, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 18, 1958, at 12.
86. Our Election Day Illusions: The Beat Majority (CBS television broadcast Jan. 5, 1961);
see also Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 83, at 497 (describing the CBS special).
87. Oral Argument at 00:00:15, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (No. 6), http://oyez.org/
cases/1960/_6#argument-1 [https://perma.cc/JW6E-ESVG].
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Fourteenth Amendment,” they boldly proclaimed.88 Federal courts
offered the last—and only—hope for reform.
Enter Justice William Brennan. Justice Brennan had long viewed
the federal courts as defenders of constitutional rights. Recalling
Justice Brennan’s legacy upon his death, President Bill Clinton
explained, “[Justice Brennan] once said the role of the Constitution
is the protection of the dignity of every human being and he rec-
ognized that every individual has fundamental human rights that
government cannot deny.”89 Given this vision, Justice Brennan
sharply disagreed with the more conservative nonintervention phi-
losophy of Justice Frankfurter. Baker gave Brennan the door he
needed to enforce his vision vis-à-vis political rights. Writing for six
members of the Court, Justice Brennan declared that legislative
apportionments presented a justiciable issue.90 The Court redefined
the political question doctrine through a multifactored test.91 Equal
protection claims revolving around apportionment presented “[j]u-
dicial standards ... [that were] well developed and familiar.”92
Suddenly, election law was born.
Yet Justice Brennan did not entirely achieve his goals. After all,
Baker did not precisely define the “contours of democratic politics.”93
88. Id. at 00:01:05.
89. Linda Greenhouse, William Brennan, 91, Dies; Gave Court Liberal Vision, N.Y. TIMES
(July 25, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/25/us/william-brennan-91-dies-gave-court-
liberal-vision.html [https://perma.cc/D6EE-7ZHJ].
90. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962). 
91. Id. at 217. Specifically, the Court identified six factors when considering whether a
question presented fell within the nonjusticiable “political question” doctrine:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or 
[2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or
[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
[4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
[5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or
[6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Id.
92. Id. at 226.
93. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy & Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601, 602 (2007).
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The case simply said that courts could hear redistricting claims.94
With a newly opened door, however, the Court started calibrating
a malapportionment standard. First came Gray v. Sanders.95 Dem-
ocratic primary voters challenged Georgia’s “county unit” electoral
system as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.96 Candidates
seeking statewide office competed on a county-by-county basis;
winning the most counties clinched the nomination.97 In Baker’s
aftermath, the Court found that Georgia’s system violated the Equal
Protection Clause.98 Justice Douglas declared that the “conception
of political equality ... can mean only one thing—one person, one
vote.”99
The Supreme Court had minted a new label. Now that bare-bones
label needed flesh. The following year, the Court handed down a
seminal decision in Reynolds v. Sims.100 There, Alabama voters chal-
lenged the legislative apportionment map for the Alabama state
legislature.101 The state map had come into existence in 1901 and
received only one minor amendment in 1903.102 Otherwise, the ap-
portionment had remained the same for over fifty years, even
though the state’s population had shifted significantly.103 The Su-
preme Court struck down this map as unconstitutional.104 The Court
held that “as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection
Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.”105 Chief
Justice Warren continued: “Simply stated, an individual’s right to
vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its
94. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
95. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
96. Id. at 370.
97. Id. at 370-71.
98. Id. at 379 (“Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is
designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote—whatever their race,
whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their
home may be in that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
99. Id. at 381. 
100. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (basing its decision once again on the Equal Protection
Clause).
101. Id. at 537-38.
102. Id. at 540.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 586-87.
105. Id. at 568.
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weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes
of citizens living in other parts of the State.”106 The Equal Protection
Clause reached into the very heart of the political thicket to require
even state legislative apportionments to meet the principle of one
person, one vote.
 As the immediate progeny demonstrate, Baker undoubtedly
changed the Court’s trajectory.107 Within nine months, litigation
cropped up in more than thirty-five states over once-barred election
issues.108 The New York Times stated that redistricting cases “burn-
[ed] like a prairie fire across the nation.”109 Baker launched a jur-
isprudential revolution. Chief Justice Earl Warren cited Baker— not
Brown v. Board of Education110 or Miranda v. Arizona111—as the
most important decision handed down during his tenure.112
Baker profoundly impacted other justices, too—“so dramatic[ally]
and so traumatic[ally] that [Baker] ‘broke’ two justices.”113 Justice
Charles Whittaker suffered an apparent nervous breakdown.114
Colleagues and relatives recalled that Justice Whittaker felt intense
pressure as the potential swing vote in the case—so much pressure,
in fact, that the Justice started speaking as if dictating an opinion,
going so far as to include oral punctuation in his conversations.115
When the Court returned from winter recess, Justice Whittaker,
without explanation, disappeared.116 He never returned to the Su-
preme Court.117
106. Id.
107. For a useful history of the evolution of the one person, one vote standard, see Derek
T. Muller, Perpetuating “One Person, One Vote” Errors, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371 (2016).
108. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 83, at 505 (citing Robert B. McKay, Political
Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REV. 645, 646,
706-10 (1963) (summarizing state apportionment litigation through 1962)).
109. Id. (quoting Layhmond Robinson, 22 States Battle on Redistricting; Fight Spurred by
High Court Ruling Is Spreading Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1962, at 23).
110. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
111. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
112. More Perfect—The Political Thicket, supra note 44.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. During this absence, Justice Whittaker apparently became “borderline suicidal.”
Id. One of his children found the Justice heading upstairs so he could retrieve a shotgun. Id.
A few days later, Justice Whittaker checked himself into a hospital. Id.
117. Id.
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Justice Felix Frankfurter suffered a similar fate. He vigorously
opposed the majority’s decision in Baker.118 Just two weeks after the
Court announced its decision in the case, Justice Frankfurter suf-
fered a massive stroke.119 In the hospital, Justice Frankfurter at-
tributed his deteriorated health to the Court’s decision.120 Like
Justice Whittaker, Justice Frankfurter never recovered.121 The
stroke forced him into retirement.122 Baker v. Carr was the last case
Felix Frankfurter heard.123 Against his vociferous objections, the
Court entangled itself with the political thicket.
Despite Chief Justice Warren’s lofty idealism, Baker did not re-
solve every election-related issue. Baker “only began the inquiry for
the long-term regulation of the political thicket.”124 The transition
from nonjusticiability to chronic litigation did not occur smoothly.
In fact, some observers have criticized the Court for not developing
a coherent democratic jurisprudence from the beginning.125 Chief
Justice Warren’s vision about “equality” proved “too abstract to
have real meaning.”126 As Professor Heather Gerken noted, “some
members of the Court tried to offer a set of mediating principles to
give shape and content to the emerging norm of equality.”127 Yet no
Justice could provide a manageable theory. “Instead, the Court
either relied upon incompletely theorized agreements, never ar-
ticulating the mediating principles it was employing to define
equality ... or [the Court] offered a minimalist theory, the narrowest
possible justification for the outcome it was reaching.”128 As the
Court methodically developed the one person, one vote theory in
118. Id. After the first oral argument in Baker, Justice Frankfurter gave a ninety-minute
speech during the ensuing judicial conference—“pulling books off the shelf ... gesticulating
wildly.” Id. During the second oral argument, Frankfurter interjected over one hundred
seventy times. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 83, at 506.
125. Charles, supra note 93, at 602; see also Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of
Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1413-14
(2002).
126. Gerken, supra note 125, at 1413.
127. Id. at 1414.
128. Id. at 1414-15.
2018] A VOICE IN THE WILDERNESS 355
malapportionment cases, other election-related issues bubbled up
through the judiciary.
When Justice Stevens took his seat on the Court in 1975, election
law was still relatively fresh. Then the Supreme Court started
hearing cases involving virtually every aspect of elections, eventu-
ally culminating in controversies about vote-counting procedures.
Over forty years later, this soil has received such significant tilling
that one court quipped: “The history of election law is one of change
and adaptation.”129 Justice Stevens embraced that change by trust-
ing the judiciary to resolve the disputes fairly. His opinions showed
that he welcomed courts’ role in resolving election law challenges,
championing impartial judges as the primary backstop to partisan
overreach by the political branches. Perhaps more than any other
justice during his tenure, Justice Stevens thought that the judiciary
could enforce a fair, democratic system.
Justice Stevens’s approach offered something the Court lacked
when it first entered the political thicket: a comprehensive demo-
cratic theory that involved judges as neutral arbiters. Justice
Stevens did not shy away from a judicial role in the political thicket
to ensure impartiality in the democratic process. He trusted judges
not to be political when resolving political issues. This theory of
impartial governance, along with his reverence for the role of
judges, defines Justice Stevens’s election law jurisprudence. The
importance of this theory for modern election law cases cements
Justice Stevens’s significant role on the Court.
Understanding Justice Stevens’s theory of democracy requires
understanding Justice Stevens himself, including the events that
helped to shape his views on judicial resolution of election law
issues. As described below, his upbringing and early career influ-
enced the election law jurisprudence he would adopt as a Justice.
II. LOCUSTS AND WILD HONEY:
A SHORT BIOGRAPHY OF JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS
Justice Stevens’s background influenced his approach to law
and democracy. As Professor Pamela Karlan noted, “Justice Stev-
ens has not been afraid to undergird his decisions with his own
129. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1303 (E.D. Cal. 1997).
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experience.”130 Justice Scalia even criticized this aspect of Justice
Stevens’s overall jurisprudence, writing that “[i]t is Justice Stev-
ens’[s] experience that reigns over all.”131 Justice Stevens’s upbring-
ing surely impacted his belief in the judge as an impartial arbiter to
oversee an election regime focused on impartial governance.
Yet Justice Stevens’s personal history defies easy categorization.
“I’m not big on labels,” he noted upon his retirement.132 Jeffrey
Toobin aptly remarked: “Respected by his colleagues, if not really
known to them, Stevens always stood apart.”133 Similarly, Professor
Cass Sunstein reflected that “[m]odest and eclectic, [Justice Stev-
ens] could not be pigeonholed, and he displayed a consistent open-
ness to both facts and arguments.”134 His maverick style hailed from
a lifetime of accumulated paradoxes. The Justice came from a Re-
publican home that revered Warren G. Harding and deeply mis-
trusted Franklin D. Roosevelt.135 He waged war in Chicago against
130. Pamela Karlan, The Partisan of the Nonpartisan, SCOTUSBLOG (May 14, 2010, 12:05
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/05/the-partisan-of-the-nonpartisan/ [https://perma.cc/
CB76-LZE3]. As Professor Karlan points out, Justice Stevens’s own history infiltrated several
of his notable decisions, “whether it was learning to drive on narrow back roads (consider his
dissent in Scott v. Harris (2007)), or surviving Prohibition (consider his dissents in Morse v.
Frederick (2007) and Granholm v. Heald (2005)).” Id.
131. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 93 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
132. Rosen, supra note 11.
133. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 6
(2008).
134. Cass R. Sunstein, The Refounding Father, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 5, 2014), http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/06/05/justice-stevens-refounding-father/ [https://perma.cc/
3UCZ-YC3S] (reviewing JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD
CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION (2014)).
135. Rosen, supra note 11. “Warren G. Harding, an Ohio Republican, was the [twenty-
ninth] President of the United States.” Frank Freidel & Hugh Sidey, The Presidents of the
United States of America: Warren G. Harding, WHITE HOUSE (2006), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/warren-g-harding [https://perma.cc/66Y3-LLB5].
President Harding served two scandal-ridden years before dying in office. See id. Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, on the other hand, was a New York Democrat who served as the thirty-
second President of the United States. Frank Freidel & Hugh Sidey, The Presidents of the
United States of America: Franklin D. Roosevelt, WHITE HOUSE (2006), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/franklin-d-roosevelt [https://perma.cc/7TH9-
TDUM]. President Roosevelt served an unprecedented twelve years. See id. His adminis-
tration oversaw, among other notable events, recovery from the Great Depression and
American involvement in the Second World War. See id. Scholars generally rank President
Roosevelt as one of the nation’s top three presidents, while President Harding usually finds
himself ranked within the bottom five. See, e.g., Presidential Historians Survey 2017, C-SPAN
(2017), https://www.c-span.org/presidentsurvey 2017/?page=overall [https://perma.cc/5NM8-
95GL].
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the corrupt Daley machine, yet he did so arm-in-arm with “good-
government Democrats.”136 Justice Stevens received his appoint-
ment from a moderate Republican—and then spent a nearly thirty-
five-year odyssey that ultimately found him leading the Court’s left-
wing jurisprudence.137 No wonder scholars have struggled to define
Justice Stevens’s legacy. Even his election law jurisprudence
embodies this paradoxical theme.
John Paul Stevens was born on April 20, 1920.138 Born into a
moderately wealthy and conservative Chicago home, Stevens en-
joyed a thoroughly bourgeois upbringing.139 His grandfather, James
Stevens, made a fortune after taking control of the Illinois Life
Insurance Company.140 With these funds, James Stevens built the
lavish Stevens Hotel, the largest hotel in the world at the time.141
James’s son (and John’s father) Ernest eventually took over man-
agement of the Stevens Hotel.142 Ernest would leave the family’s
three-story Hyde Park home every morning at 4:00 AM to manage
the family hotel.143 At night, he would read classic literature to his
four children, including John.144 The Roaring Twenties greatly
expanded the Chicago skyline, further rewarding the Stevens’s
family hotel business.145 The hotel boasted famous guests such as
Charles Lindbergh and Amelia Earhart, both met by a young
John.146 Life initially glittered grandly for him.
Yet this comfortable environment did not inoculate Stevens from
tragedy. The Great Depression ravaged the family business.147 The
Illinois Life Insurance Company accused the elder Stevens men of
136. Rosen, supra note 11.
137. See id.; see also Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Is Off the Bench But Not Out of
Opinions, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/us/31bar.html
[https://perma.cc/D9YC-B3GJ].
138. BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE 22
(2010).
139. Id. at 23-24.
140. Id. at 24-25.
141. Id. at 25-26.
142. Id. at 26.
143. Id. at 23, 28.
144. Id. at 22, 28.
145. See id. at 25.
146. Id. at 27.
147. See id. at 31.
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diverting insurance funds illegally into the sinking hotels.148 A
grand jury indicted his father on charges of embezzlement.149
Stevens’s father lamented that “[w]e are the unhappy victims of the
[D]epression and ... we are now being held up to the public gaze as
horrible examples—formally indicted as conspirators and embez-
zlers.”150 A jury later convicted the elder Stevens.151 The event dev-
astated young “Johnny,” who adored his father.152 But the Illinois
Supreme Court later overturned the conviction.153 Significantly, the
court exonerated Stevens’s father because “[t]here is here no evi-
dence of fraudulent intent. We are of the opinion that the record
does not justify the verdict of guilty.”154 That is, the actual evidence
in the record mattered the most in the elder Stevens’s exonera-
tion—a fact not lost on the future Justice Stevens. Undoubtedly, the
entire episode deeply impacted Stevens’s understanding of the
judicial system. “Of course, I respected the decision, but I was pretty
young at the time—though I remember the words ‘not a scintilla of
evidence,’” the Justice later reflected.155
In fact, John went into law himself. He first studied English at
the University of Chicago.156 Then, in 1945, after a brief stint in the
Navy, John enrolled at Northwestern University School of Law.157
There “John” became “John Paul.”158 “I had a professor who said
that every lawyer should have something unique about them,” Jus-
tice Stevens noted.159 “Some people sign their names in green ink,
some people did other things. I had this very boring name. Who can
remember ‘John Stevens’? So I added my middle name.”160
Newly minted John Paul brought his formidable intellect to bear
in record-shattering ways. The future Justice graduated first in his
law school class in 1947 with the highest grade point average ever
148. Id.
149. People v. Stevens, 193 N.E. 154, 155 (Ill. 1934).
150. BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 138, at 32.
151. Stevens, 193 N.E. at 158.
152. Cf. BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 138, at 27, 32.
153. Stevens, 193 N.E. at 160.
154. Id.
155. Toobin, supra note 6.
156. BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 138, at 41-42, 52.
157. Id. at 43, 52-53.
158. Toobin, supra note 6.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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recorded in the school’s history.161 John Paul also served as co-ed-
itor-in-chief of the Northwestern University Law Review.162 Promi-
nent faculty members soon connected John Paul with United States
Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge.163 In a telephone call with
the Justice, the faculty warned that John Paul “came from a family
of Republican businessmen” and was “politically quite conser-
vative.”164 Justice Rutledge quipped back: “I think that’s something
I can take care of, don’t you?”165
Naturally, John Paul’s clerkship significantly shaped his legal
career. Observers have described John Paul Stevens as Wiley Rut-
ledge’s jurisprudential heir.166 As Justice Stevens himself later
reflected, Justice Rutledge believed in “wide discretion to judges ...
and to administrative agencies.”167 This discretion-based jurispru-
dence appeared in Justice Stevens’s writings as well, notably in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.168
Echoes also sounded in Justice Stevens’s approach to election law,
where he afforded significant latitude to the States in administering
elections and to judges in remaining impartial in these partisan
cases.
Following his clerkship, John Paul returned to Chicago, where
he worked as an antitrust lawyer.169 Justice Stevens’s experiences
in Chicago undoubtedly contributed to his election law jurispru-
dence. In fact, one commentator noted that “the grittier experience
of living and practicing law in a city known for greased palms and
political machines[ ] made Stevens the justice he is.”170 Like most
Chicagoans, John Paul “had no trouble viewing nearly every public
161. Rosen, supra note 11.
162. BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 138, at 55.
163. Id. at 62. Allegedly, the faculty had two Supreme Court connections, one with Chief
Justice Fred Vinson and the other with Justice Wiley Rutledge. Id. A coin flip between
Northwestern’s top students matched John Paul Stevens with Justice Rutledge. Id.
164. Id. at 63.
165. Id.
166. Norman Dorsen, John Paul Stevens, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xxv, xxviii.
167. John Paul Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in MR. JUSTICE 177, 187 (Allison Dunham
& Philip B. Kurland eds., 1956).
168. 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984).
169. Rosen, supra note 11.
170. Stephanie Francis Ward, A Man of Moderation: The Last Justice of the ‘Greatest
Generation,’ Gentlemanly John Paul Stevens, Says Farewell, A.B.A. J. 49, 51 (May 2010).
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phenomenon in his hometown through the lens of local politics.”171
When Pablo Picasso donated a rather cryptic steel statue to Chi-
cago, John Paul Stevens wrote:
[The statue] is unquestionably an imaginative and dramatic
representation of an elephant. What could possibly amuse its
creator more than to persuade our wonderful mayor that the
Civic Center should be decorated with a world-famous statue of
an elephant? Only a truly great artist could work such a miracle
of presenting a 162-ton Republican totem to decorate the front
yard of the Democratic organization of Mayor Richard J.
Daley.172
Despite this good-humored jab at the Chicago machine, however,
John Paul Stevens remained largely aloof from politics.173
Politics did not remain aloof from Stevens, however. Living in
Chicago as a moderate Republican was not an easy task. A former
Justice Stevens clerk—Lawrence Rosenthal—noted that “[w]hen
[Stevens] was growing up in Chicago, politics were dominated by the
corrupt Democrat machine.”174 Rosenthal also added: “[I]f you be-
lieved in good government and were a reformer—a particular kind
of reformer who wanted to clean the stables—you were a Republican
in Chicago.”175
This clean, apolitical image ended up putting John Paul Stevens
in the spotlight. In 1969, Illinois witnessed the downfall of two
justices from the Illinois Supreme Court.176 Just two years earlier,
Associate Justice Ray Klingbiel announced the unanimous opinion
of the court in People v. Isaacs.177 The court affirmed the dismissal
of a multi-count public corruption indictment against Theodore
Isaacs.178 Yet Mr. Isaacs did not disappear from public scrutiny; in
fact, he soon found himself connected to a new scandal involving
171. BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 138, at 131.
172. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
173. KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS JUSTICE: THE SCANDAL OF 1969 AND THE RISE OF
JOHN PAUL STEVENS 37 (2001).
174. Ward, supra note 170, at 51.
175. Id.
176. MANASTER, supra note 173, at xiv.
177. 226 N.E.2d 38, 41, 54 (Ill. 1967).
178. Id. at 54.
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none other than Justice Klingbiel.179 A prominent figure in local
Democratic politics, Isaacs served as one founder of the Civic Center
Bank & Trust Company.180 Muckrakers in Chicago suspected the
bank of functioning as a laundering hub for local politicians.181 As
the muckrakers delved deeper into the issue, their subsequent
investigation revealed two telling shareholders in the bank: grand-
children of Justice Klingbiel.182 The Illinois Supreme Court ap-
pointed a special commission to investigate the brewing scandal,
with Frank Greenberg, head of the Chicago Bar Association, serving
as chairman.183 Greenberg asked John Paul Stevens if he would
serve as essentially special prosecutor in the case.184
Despite having no prosecutorial experience, Stevens agreed.185 In
many ways, Stevens embodied the perfect choice. He tried antitrust
cases almost exclusively in federal courts, giving him the necessary
distance from possible retaliation at the state level.186 His apolitical
image also drove home the idea that “[h]e didn’t have an ax to
grind.”187 Stevens gave himself vigorously to the task. During his
investigation, Stevens discovered the mirage underlying the una-
nimity in Isaacs.188 Two justices had disagreed with the majority yet
“smothered their dissents” under pressure.189
The subsequent inquiry found that Justice Klingbiel had acted
improperly, and Stevens’s investigation also turned up another
shocking stockholder in the Civic Center Bank: Illinois Supreme
Court Chief Justice Solfisburg.190 At the time, Chief Justice Sol-
fisburg stood as a rising star in the Illinois judiciary.191 When Chief
Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court announced
his impending retirement, Solfisburg met with Senator Everett
179. MANASTER, supra note 173, at 4.
180. Id. at 7, 9.
181. Id. at 3-4.
182. Id. at 4.
183. Id. at 25.
184. Id. at 37.
185. Cf. id.
186. Ward, supra note 170, at 54.
187. Id. (quoting Judge William J. Bauer of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals).
188. Douglas A. Hedin, 71 HENNEPIN LAW. 16, 23 (2002) (reviewing MANASTER, supra note
173).
189. Id.
190. MANASTER, supra note 173, at 106-07, 228.
191. Id. at 57.
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Dirksen about filling the vacancy.192 Senator Dirksen eventually
passed the recommendation up to Richard Nixon’s Attorney Gen-
eral, John Mitchell.193 At that time, another seat had opened when
Justice Abe Fortas resigned amidst his own scandal.194 Roy Solfis-
burg seemed destined to take a seat on the nation’s High Court.
That all came crashing down after John Paul Stevens’s investiga-
tion linked Solfisburg with the potential wrongdoing in Isaacs.195
The special commission eventually released a report, noting: “The
integrity of the judgment in the Isaacs case is affected by what we
have found to be the appearance of impropriety on the part of two
of the Justices, Solfisburg and Klingbiel, who participated in the
decision.”196 The report ominously concluded: “The Commission be-
lieves that such [judicial] confidence can best be restored by the
prompt resignation of the two Justices.”197 No longer did Chief
Justice Solfisburg entertain hopes that he would replace the dis-
graced Justice Abe Fortas, let alone the venerable Chief Justice Earl
Warren; in fact, both Solfisburg and Klingbiel resigned their seats
on the Illinois Supreme Court.198
Yet the fall of one Supreme Court contender produced another.
Stevens had not intended on using his role in the investigation “as
a public steppingstone.”199 Nonetheless, the experience widened his
reputation. After the investigation, Senator Charles H. Percy—a
former classmate at the University of Chicago—brought Stevens’s
name to the Nixon White House.200 In 1970, President Nixon nom-
inated John Paul Stevens for the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.201
Following the judicial scandals of the late 1960s, as well as the
national upheaval surrounding the Watergate crisis, John Paul
192. See id. at 57-59.
193. Id. at 59.
194. Andrew Glass, Abe Fortas Resigns from Supreme Court May 15, 1969, POLITICO (May
15, 2008, 04:12 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2008/05/abe-fortas-resigns-from-supreme-
court-may-15-1969-010346 [https://perma.cc/9ZD2-HJVW].
195. MANASTER, supra note 173, at 107.
196. Id. at 228.
197. Id. at 229.
198. See id. at 239.
199. See Ward, supra note 170, at 54 (quoting Judge William J. Bauer of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals).
200. Id. at 55; see also MANASTER, supra note 173, at 265.
201. See Rosen, supra note 11.
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Stevens represented a judge who emanated judicial integrity and
could restore public confidence in the judiciary. It was little surprise
that President Ford would nominate Judge Stevens to become
Justice Stevens just five years later.202 Stevens sailed through
Senate confirmation with no controversy.203
John Paul Stevens lived a rich life that equipped him with a
unique perspective on democracy. Stevens grew up in a city long
known for “bare-knuckled partisanship dominated by machine pol-
itics and tainted by episodic outright irregularity.”204 Ironically, the
very year that Justice Stevens took his seat, the Supreme Court
found itself navigating another current in election law: regulating
campaign finance.205 Although Justice Stevens did not participate
in the seminal Buckley v. Valeo decision,206 he shaped the conflu-
ence of law and democracy for the next three and a half decades.
III. CLEARING THE WAY:
THE IMPACT OF JOHN PAUL STEVENS ON ELECTION LAW
John Paul Stevens came onto the scene fourteen years after the
Court plunged into the political thicket in Baker v. Carr.207 The
Court had decided other seminal election law cases since Baker,
including Reynolds v. Sims, an important opinion that set out the
one person, one vote standard.208 Yet election law still presented
fresh issues for the young Justice. Essentially, Justice Stevens’s
view of an impartial government demanded that the courts act
when majorities attempted to entrench themselves. For Justice
Stevens, the Court’s non-intervention period represented a stark
failure in the democratic process. The political branches were “man-
ifestly unable to solve the problem of [inequality],” requiring judicial
intervention.209 The Court had entered the political thicket. There
was no turning back. Instead, for Justice Stevens, the Courts’ role
was to ensure fairness and impartiality in the democratic process.
202. Id.
203. See id. The Senate confirmed Stevens 98-0. Id.
204. See Karlan, supra note 130.
205. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976).
206. Id. at 144.
207. See 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
208. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
209. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 680 n.39 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Amidst all these thorns and thistles, Justice Stevens attempted
to enunciate a clear vision about how the Court should resolve elec-
tion law cases. In a concurring opinion early in his career on the
Supreme Court, Justice Stevens laid out a democratic theory that
would pervade his entire election law jurisprudence. Justice Stevens
stated:
The Equal Protection Clause requires every State to govern
impartially. When a State adopts rules governing its election
machinery or defining electoral boundaries, those rules must
serve the interests of the entire community. If they serve no
purpose other than to favor one segment—whether racial,
ethnic, religious, economic, or political—that may occupy a
position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disad-
vantage a politically weak segment of the community, they
violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.210
This impartial governance theory undergirded Justice Stevens’s
views across election law. From gerrymandering to campaign fi-
nance, voter identification laws to vote-counting procedures, Justice
Stevens imagined one clear standard: our American democracy
worked best when the government heeded the duty to rule impar-
tially. Judges could act as neutral arbiters to ensure impartiality
remained consistent throughout the electoral process. That stan-
dard now stands as John Paul Stevens’s enduring legacy.
Detailing all of Justice Stevens’s opinions on election law would
require many pages. Instead, this Part focuses on Justice Stevens’s
major contributions vis-à-vis his impartial governance legacy. First,
this Part explains how Justice Stevens essentially created a sub-
field regarding election administration by setting out a balancing
test for analyzing voter identification and similar nuts-and-bolts is-
sues, marking Justice Stevens’s most important contribution to
election law. That balancing test, which trusts judges to make the
“hard judgments”211 in these cases to ensure impartiality, shapes
today’s judicial fights over many aspects of the democratic process.
210. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
211. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 790 (1983) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724, 730 (1974)).
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Second, this Part examines Justice Stevens’s views on legislative
redistricting. In particular, this Part analyzes Justice Stevens’s
crusade against gerrymandering and the continuing impact his
views have had on jurisprudence in this field—especially the role his
approach may play in today’s partisan gerrymandering fights.
Third, this Part looks at Justice Stevens’s position on campaign
finance. Although Jeffrey Toobin called these views Justice Stev-
ens’s “[s]wan [s]ong,”212 his dissenting voice has nonetheless inspir-
ed at least one federal court to champion the relationship between
campaign finance and an impartial government.
Finally, this Part shows how Justice Stevens trusted judges even
in one of the most controversial cases to reach the Court, Bush v.
Gore,213 which essentially decided the 2000 presidential election.
Throughout, Justice Stevens showed a reverence for judges to en-
sure impartial governance.
Justice Brennan once quipped that he could not “pretend to know
exactly why Justice Stevens has chosen so often to explain why his
colleagues were marching in the wrong direction.”214 Even Justice
Stevens himself acknowledged his own prolificacy, stating, “I do
clutter up the U.S. Reports with more separate writing than most
lawyers have either time or inclination to read.”215 Election law
provides no exception. In each distinctive area, Justice Stevens
wrote extensively. His opinions—whether writing for the Court, in
a separate concurrence, or even in dissent—have shaped the law of
democracy. In particular, Justice Stevens persistently outlined an
impartial governance theory of election law. This vision should
stand as the Chicagoan’s legacy.
A. Election Administration
Justice Stevens’s views have been front and center when it comes
to election administration, which includes the nuts-and-bolts of
casting a ballot. Justice Stevens penned two of the opinions in the
critical trilogy that created the doctrine known as “Anderson-
212. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT 182
(2012).
213. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
214. MANASTER, supra note 173, at 273.
215. John Paul Stevens, Introduction to id. xii.
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Burdick-Crawford ”—or “ABC”—balancing that lower courts now
use on a regular basis.216 This test gives deference to states to run
their elections, while trusting judges to evaluate the state’s inter-
est in the law as compared to the burdens that the law imposes on
individual voters.217 Indeed, for better or worse—and there is a lot
to both champion and criticize in this approach218—Justice Stev-
ens’s creation of this test still impacts crucial litigation involving
the law of democracy during every election cycle. Some observers
fault Justice Stevens for ratcheting down the level of scrutiny used
to review voting rules, thus giving states more leeway to enact laws
with a partisan intent under the guise of election integrity or the
need for breathing room to administer elections.219 One of us has
argued previously that the Supreme Court has given undue def-
erence to states in how they run their elections.220 Our goal here,
however, is not necessarily to criticize Justice Stevens’s approach;
instead, we simply highlight how critical his approach has been for
the judicial development of this area.
The Court used to apply strict scrutiny review to regulations of
the fundamental right to vote. For instance, in Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, the Court struck down a state poll tax because
it burdened the “fundamental” right to vote without an accompany-
ing compelling state interest.221 Similarly, in Kramer v. Union Free
School District No. 15, the Court discussed voting using the familiar
fundamental rights framework.222
Yet over time, the Court has backed away from strict scrutiny.
Justice Stevens initiated this move. In Anderson v. Celebrezze,
the Justice recognized voting as a fundamental right, while also
216. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185 (2008) (controlling opinion
authored by Justice Stevens); Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 782 (same); see also Joshua A. Douglas,
The History of Voter ID Laws and the Story of Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, in
ELECTION LAW STORIES 490 (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016).
217. Douglas, supra note 216, at 490.
218. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U.
L. REV. 553 (2015).
219. Id. at 555 (“The Court’s broad deference to state voting rules is concerning for two
main reasons. First, it is doctrinally inconsistent with the structure of the United States
Constitution. Second, it is alarming given the increasing number of restrictive and partisan-
laden voting laws states are enacting.”).
220. Id.
221. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
222. 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969).
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acknowledging that states need significant leeway to administer an
election.223 “[A]s a practical matter,” Justice Stevens wrote, “there
must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair
and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to ac-
company the democratic processes.”224 Because states have impor-
tant regulatory interests in ensuring fairness and equality, Justice
Stevens elided the more rigid strict scrutiny test from Harper and
created a balancing test instead.225 When state laws burden the
right to vote, Justice Stevens announced, courts “must first consider
the character and magnitude of the asserted injury.”226 Second,
courts “must identify and evaluate the precise interests put
forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its
rule.”227 After identifying both the burdens on a voter and the State’s
regulatory interests, the courts must then weigh the two categories
against each other.228
The Anderson test gave courts significant discretion to depart
from strict scrutiny by imposing less rigid review to a state’s elec-
tion rules. As a result, states received more deference in adminis-
tering elections. That deference widened further in Burdick v.
Takushi.229 The Court explicitly stated what Justice Stevens had
only implied in Anderson: not every burden on voting requires strict
scrutiny.230 Instead, “when [voting] rights are subjected to ‘severe’
restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a
state interest of compelling importance.’ But when a state election
law imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ ... ‘the
State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to
justify’ the restrictions.”231 Burdick thus added a threshold question:
Is the State severely restricting the right to vote via the challenged
regulation?232 If so, then the courts should apply the normal strict
223. 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
224. Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
225. See id. at 788-89.
226. Id. at 789.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
230. Id. at 433-34.
231. Id. at 434 (citations omitted).
232. Id.; see also Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 205 (2008) (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment) (“Thus, the first step is to decide whether a challenged law se-
verely burdens the right to vote.”).
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scrutiny test.233 But if not, courts must engage in the less-strict
balancing test that Justice Stevens described in Anderson.234
Interestingly, Justice Stevens joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent in
Burdick.235 Yet Justice Kennedy explicitly approved the majority’s
refinement of the Anderson test: “I agree as well with the careful
statement the Court gives of the test to be applied in this case to
determine if the right to vote has been constricted.”236 Justice
Kennedy merely disagreed with the majority’s application of the test
to the specific facts in Burdick.237
If Justice Stevens disagreed with the gloss that Burdick placed
upon the Anderson test, he could have done so in Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board, the third seminal decision in this
trilogy.238 The case provides a test specifically for construing voter
identification laws, a major battleground over the last decade,
though doctrinally the test applies to any election administration
issue.239 Justice Stevens invoked—with some modification—the test
from Anderson and Burdick.240 In Crawford, Justice Stevens’s
plurality started with the proffered reasons for the government
regulation.241 That is, Justice Stevens reversed the order that he
originally used in Anderson to compare the burdens on the voter
with the state’s interest. Under Crawford, the court should initially
analyze the state’s important regulatory interests and then com-
pare those interests to the severity of the burden on an individual’s
right to vote.242 Such a starting point in the analysis suggests that
the states continue to receive significant deference in election ad-
ministration.
Crawford has served as the lynchpin for subsequent cases in-
volving voter identification laws. In fact, federal courts have cited
Crawford more than two hundred times in the first decade since the
233. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. 
234. Id.
235. Id. at 442.
236. Id. at 445.
237. Id. at 446 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“I submit the conclusion must be that the write-in
ban deprives some voters of any substantial voice in selecting candidates for the entire range
of offices at issue in a particular election.”).
238. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
239. See id. at 185-86, 189-91.
240. Id. at 189-90.
241. Id. at 191.
242. Id.
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decision.243 Most of these cases invoke the “ABC” balancing test that
Justice Stevens formulated in Anderson and used again in Craw-
ford.
The Seventh Circuit’s case law over voter ID shows how courts
have wrestled with how to apply the Crawford balancing test. In
2011, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker signed into law a new strict
voter identification measure.244 The law requires a voter to show a
valid, non-expired photo identification to vote.245 Shortly thereafter,
litigation wound through both the state and federal courts. Initially,
both the Wisconsin Supreme Court246 and the Seventh Circuit247
upheld the voter identification procedure. Both opinions relied heav-
ily on Crawford. In Frank v. Walker (Frank I), for instance, the
Seventh Circuit reversed an injunction against Wisconsin’s voter
identification law.248 The district court found the burdens in Frank
I more significant than those presented in Crawford, but Judge
Frank H. Easterbrook disagreed.249 The Seventh Circuit concluded
that “Crawford requires us to reject a constitutional challenge to
Wisconsin’s statute.”250 Yet this result, although espousing confor-
mity with Crawford, seemed at odds with Justice Stevens’s theory
of democratic impartiality because the evidence was clearer in
Wisconsin that the law would prevent certain valid voters from
participating in an election.251 After all, opponents accused Wiscon-
sin Republicans of adopting the law specifically to disenfranchise
minority voters who typically did not vote Republican.252 This fact
243. Citing references for Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008),
WESTLAW NEXT, http://next.westlaw.com (follow “Citing References” hyperlink; then click
“Cases” tab; then check “Federal” box) (showing that more than 200 federal courts have cited
Crawford in the ten years since the Court issued its opinion in that case).
244. Reuters, Wisconsin Voter ID Law Signed by Scott Walker, HUFFINGTON POST (May
25, 2011, 5:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/25/wisconsin-voter-id-law-scott-
walker_n_867090.html [https://perma.cc/77WU-4KRT].
245. League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 302, 305
(Wis. 2014).
246. Id.
247. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Frank I ].
248. Id.
249. Id. at 745-46 (“Wisconsin's law differs from Indiana's, but not in ways that matter
under the analysis in Crawford.”).
250. Id. at 751.
251. Id. at 746.
252. Michael Wines, Some Republicans Acknowledge Leveraging Voter ID Laws for Political
Gain, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/some-republicans-
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shows the malleability of Justice Stevens’s test—while perhaps
useful to give states breathing room to run their elections, some
may validly claim that it does not sufficiently protect the fundamen-
tal right to vote.
After the Seventh Circuit refused to hear the case en banc on an
evenly divided vote253—prompting a fiery dissent from Judge Rich-
ard Posner that had echoes of Justice Stevens’s theory of impartial
governance254—the court faced the matter once again, this time after
the plaintiffs brought better evidence of the burdens the law would
impose.255 Importantly, the plaintiffs pressed an as-applied chal-
lenge, arguing that even if the law might be valid in the abstract,
the evidence demonstrated the law’s unconstitutionality as applied
to the plaintiffs, who would suffer unique burdens in obtaining a
compliant identification.256 Indeed, Justice Stevens himself had
rejected a facial challenge in Crawford but left the door open to an
as-applied challenge if plaintiffs could produce better evidence of the
burdens the law would impose.257 This time, Judge Easterbrook—
again writing for the panel—sided with the plaintiffs.258 The plain-
tiffs in Frank II had presented identifiable burdens that, under the
Crawford test, outweighed the government’s proffered interest in
combating fraud.259 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit focused on the as-
applied nature of the plaintiffs’ challenge,260 which is consistent
with Justice Stevens’s impartial governance theory of determining
whether a law will actually produce unfairness in the election pro-
cess. “The right to vote is personal,” Easterbrook wrote, “and is not
defeated by the fact that 99% of other people can secure the
necessary credentials easily.”261 Further, “[p]laintiffs now accept the
propriety of requiring photo ID from persons who already have or
can get it with reasonable effort, while endeavoring to protect the
acknowledge-leveraging-voter-id-laws-for-political-gain.html [https://perma.cc/YD5F-XL32].
253. Frank v.Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 783 (7th Cir. 2014).
254. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
255. Frank v. Walker, 819 F.3d 384, 385-87 (7th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Frank II ].
256. Id. at 386.
257. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Significance of the Shift Toward As-Applied Challenges
in Election Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 650 (2009).
258. Frank II, 819 F.3d at 385, 388.
259. Id. at 385-86.
260. See id. at 386-87.
261. Id. at 386.
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voting rights of those who encounter high hurdles.”262 This balanc-
ing, Judge Easterbrook concluded, “is compatible with Crawford.”263
Like Judge Posner had done in his dissent from the denial to hear
Frank I en banc,264 (which signaled his evolving understanding
given that he had written the Seventh Circuit’s Crawford opinion
upholding the Indiana law265), Judge Easterbrook now recognized
the impartial governance theory undergirding Crawford.266 When
the record evidence presented facts impugning an election system’s
impartiality because it harmed certain voters, and when the plain-
tiffs brought an as-applied challenge using that evidence, then the
result could be different even using the same balancing test.
Because the plaintiffs in Frank II had demonstrated cognizable
burdens—burdens that implicated the impartiality of Wisconsin’s
government—the judiciary had an obligation to correct the error.
The Seventh Circuit’s approach apparently tracks Justice Stev-
ens’s own thoughts. Although he authored Crawford, the Justice has
had mixed feelings about the case post-retirement.267 Justice
Stevens stated that he felt Crawford reached the correct result,
albeit producing an “unfortunate decision.”268 When asked whether
he would reach the same conclusion in 2016 as he did in 2008, the
Justice ultimately said: “That’s a tough question. I really don’t know
for sure.”269 In a post-retirement conversation with Justice Elena
Kagan, Justice Stevens commented:
I learned a lot of things outside the record that made me very
concerned about that statute.... So I had the question: Should I
rely on my own research or what’s in the record? And I thought
in that case I had a duty to confine myself to what the record did
prove, and I thought it did not prove the plaintiffs’ case.270
262. Id.
263. Id. at 387.
264. Frank I, 773 F.3d 783, 783-84 (7th Cir. 2014).
265. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 950, 954 (7th Cir. 2007).
266. Frank II, 819 F.3d at 386-87.
267. Robert Barnes, Stevens Says Supreme Court Decision on Voter ID Was Correct, but
Maybe Not Right, WASH. POST (May 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
courts_law/stevens-says-supreme-court-decision-on-voter-id-was-correct-but-maybe-not-right/
2016/05/15/9683c51c-193f-11e6-9e16-2e5a123aac62_story.html [https://perma.cc/7C99-B7YL].
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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Perhaps Justice Stevens considered his father’s experience with the
judiciary when deciding Crawford. “A totally unjust conviction, I can
assure you,” Justice Stevens later told the New York Times about
his father.271 “There is not a scintilla of evidence of any concealment
or fraud attempted.”272 Evidence mattered for Justice Stevens.
Unlike the dissenting justices in Crawford, he did not want to look
beyond the record. With his father’s conviction,273 Justice Stevens
had witnessed the injustice that occurs when factors other than the
evidence in the record inform a judicial decision.
Other courts also have recognized the difficult—though Justice
Stevens would likely say vital—judicial task that Crawford pre-
sents. In Veasey v. Abbott, for instance, the Fifth Circuit (sitting en
banc) struck down Texas’s voter identification law.274 The court
acknowledged that Crawford’s test seemed to favor a state’s reg-
ulatory interests: “Crawford clearly established that states have
strong interests in preventing voter fraud and increasing voter
confidence by safeguarding the integrity of elections. We do not deny
that the State in this case may pursue those interests, nor that
they are strong and valid interests.”275 Yet Crawford did not provide
a “preventing voter fraud” talisman the State could blankly in-
voke.276 As the court concluded, “that acknowledgement [that the
State possesses strong interests in preventing voter fraud and
increasing voter confidence] does not address the additional as-
applied challenges Plaintiffs make in this case.”277 The plaintiffs had
presented actual evidence on the burdens of the law and document-
ed actual harm to voters, implicating an impartial governance
problem for Texas’s elections.278
271. Rosen, supra note 11.
272. Id. (quoting People v. Stevens, 193 N.E. 154, 160 (Ill. 1934)).
273. See People v. Stevens, 193 N.E. 154, 158 (Ill. 1934).
274. 830 F.3d 216, 272 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Although the Fifth Circuit heavily
discussed Crawford in Veasey, the court did not find the voter identification law in Texas
constitutionally infirm under the “ABC” balancing standard. Id. at 248-49, 272. Rather, the
court held that the voter identification law violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at
272.
275. Id. at 249 (citation omitted).
276. See id. at 248 n.39.
277. Id. at 249.
278. See id. The Fifth Circuit subsequently upheld Texas’s newer version of its voter ID law
once the legislature modified it to comply with the prior Fifth Circuit decision. See Veasey v.
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Justice Stevens’s Crawford opinion, though only a plurality, has
animated some observers and frustrated others. Conservatives may
applaud the decision while liberals may lament it because the case
left the door open to stricter voter identification laws. Justice
Stevens surely believed, at least when he wrote the opinion, that his
pragmatic approach best furthered impartial elections, regardless
of any partisan effect. Of course, he may have been wrong in the
application of his test given the evidence that voter identification
laws root out hardly any voter fraud while actually disenfranchising
various groups of voters.279 He somehow seemed blind to what many
have suggested was the clear partisan intent behind Indiana’s
law,280 perhaps because he was particularly attuned to election
fraud given his upbringing as a Republican in Chicago. But re-
gardless of its application in that case, the test still endures. Thus,
as a descriptive matter, his approach for election administration
cases has been influential, though we can certainly debate whether
that influence has been positive or negative for how our elections
operate today.
The overall “ABC” balancing test represents an important tenet
in Justice Stevens’s legacy. When the Justice formulated the doc-
trine, he no doubt thought that deference would best serve the
ideals of impartial governance. After all, the initial case—Ander-
son—centered around providing a fair ballot access process for
independent candidates outside of the two-party system.281 And even
in Crawford, Justice Stevens hesitated to venture beyond the re-
cord;282 impartial decision-makers such as himself simply must ap-
ply the law to the facts presented. Again, that supposed virtue may
also serve as a valid criticism of the decision given what many see
as a judicial failure to root out the effects of strict voter identifica-
tion laws and other partisan-laden voting rules.283 Indeed, Justice
Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 797, 804 (5th Cir. 2018).
279. See, e.g., Shelley de Alth, ID at the Polls: Assessing the Impact of Recent State Voter
ID Laws on Voter Turnout, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 185, 186 (2009).
280. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Evans, J., dissenting) (“Let’s not beat around the bush: The Indiana voter photo ID law is a
not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain folks believed to
skew Democratic.”).
281. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
282. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008).
283. Douglas, supra note 216, at 594.
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Stevens would likely balk at upholding most voter identification
laws under his own test today. Many people believe that voter
identification laws stem in part from an insidious motivation of
entrenchment and partisan manipulation of electoral outcomes.284
Entrenchment stands in stark contrast to impartiality. Most lower
courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in Frank, have understood the
ABC balancing test to encompass Justice Stevens’s underlying
theory about democratic impartiality, even if the courts have not
said so explicitly.285 This application of the balancing test for elec-
tion administration cases demonstrates the importance of recogniz-
ing Justice Stevens’s legacy as infusing election law with a theory
of impartial governance. Even where mechanized tests apply, courts
keenly recognize the spirit lurking behind the rule. As an analyst
with the Brennan Center for Justice explained:
Justice Stevens cannot plausibly be cited today for the proposi-
tion that ... oppressive new voting laws are justifiable by virtue
of some form of voter fraud that ... officials have never been able
to prove.... He likely had no idea when he voted in 2008 to
uphold that Indiana voter identification law that officials of one
party would use it to try to restrict the voting rights of members
of the other party.286
After growing up as a Republican in Mayor Daley’s Chicago,
Justice Stevens may have been particularly attuned to the concerns
of voter fraud. He likely had strong views on this issue given the
widespread speculation that Mayor Daley’s Democratic machine
stuffed ballot boxes in Chicago in the 1960 presidential election to
help John F. Kennedy win Illinois.287 Perhaps, then, he was not as
concerned in Crawford about the lack of explicit evidence of voter
fraud. Yet even so, he still expounded upon a test in Crawford that,
284. See, e.g., Zoltan L. Hajnal et al., Do Voter Identification Laws Suppress Minority Vot-
ing? Yes. We Did the Research., WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/15/do-voter-identification-laws-suppress-minority-voting-
yes-we-did-the-research/ [https://perma.cc/6HNW-2KQS]; Wines, supra note 252.
285. See Frank II, 819 F.3d 384, 386-87 (7th Cir. 2016).
286. Andrew Cohen, The Truth About Justice Stevens and the Voting Rights Act, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/truth-about-justice-
stevens-and-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/5SNV-DRAX].
287. See EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 220-24 (2016).
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when applied faithfully, can help to prevent partisan operatives
from manipulating election rules, allowing an impartial judiciary to
ensure a continued impartial election system.
The Anderson-Burdick-Crawford balancing test applies to more
than just voter identification laws. Courts use it to analyze many
aspects of the electoral process, including challenges to voter regis-
tration requirements, cutbacks in early voting, and ballot access
rules, among others.288 Courts invoke the test anytime an individual
voter claims that a state election rule is infringing on the right to
vote. Accordingly, Justice Stevens’s creation of this test has had a
significant impact on much of the law of democracy. Given the
implications of this approach for how our elections operate, this
balancing test serves as one of Justice Stevens’s most significant
contributions on the Court.
B. Legislative Districting
In 1812, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry signed into law
a controversial redistricting plan.289 The new map produced a few
oddly shaped districts that clearly favored Governor Gerry’s own
Democratic-Republican Party.290 In fact, some observers thought
that one of the contorted districts even resembled a salamander.291
The press had a field day with the governor’s ham-handed approach.
The Boston-based Centinel published a political cartoon satirizing
the new map as resembling a dragon-like monster.292 The Boston
Gazette penned a new portmanteau for the phenomenon, combin-
ing the governor’s name with the pareidolic creature the district
288. See, e.g., Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 429-30 (6th Cir. 2012).
289. Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/309084/ [https://perma.cc/TQC8-
T3GW].
290. See id.
291. Id.
292. See Renard Sexton & Dan Berman, Breaking News: U.S. and U.K. Redistricting
Processes Equally Boneheaded, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 12, 2010, 11:30 AM), https://fivethirty
eight.com/features/us-and-uk-redistricting-processes/ [https://perma.cc/2U9A-JQK9].
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supposedly represented.293 Ever since, “gerrymandering” has pla-
gued American politics.294
Legislative line-drawing first pulled the Supreme Court into the
political thicket in Baker v. Carr.295 Yet the doctrine has expanded
beyond the “one person, one vote” standard from Reynolds v. Sims296
to include other potential cartographic concerns. Two issues in par-
ticular have resulted in constant litigation. First, racial gerry-
mandering has plagued the line-drawing process in some places.297
Racial gerrymandering occurs when legislators create districts using
race-conscious criteria. For example, racial gerrymandering exists
when “[a] reapportionment plan ... includes in one district individu-
als who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely
separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may
have little in common with one another but the color of their
skin.”298 The Supreme Court has stated that such maps “bear[ ] an
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.”299 Accordingly,
the Court held that districts gerrymandered along racial lines—even
those intended to benefit a minority race—violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.300 Absent a smoking gun statement proving discrimi-
natory intent, the Court found that litigants could demonstrate a
racial gerrymander by showing that a redistricting plan is “so highly
irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as
293. See Catie Edmonson, The Gerry Behind Gerrymandering, BOS. GLOBE (June 22, 2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/06/22/the-gerry-behind-gerrymandering/QUbhL
72qv6TuM3Kklg6REM/story.html [https://perma.cc/LNJ7-L69Y].
294. Emily Barasch, The Twisted History of Gerrymandering in American Politics,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/the-twisted-
history-of-gerrymandering-in-american-politics/262369/ [https://perma.cc/E5GS-9XQ3]. Ger-
rymandering, however, predated even Governor Gerry. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267,
274 (2004) (“Political gerrymanders are not new to the American scene. One scholar traces
them back to the Colony of Pennsylvania at the beginning of the 18th century, where several
counties conspired to minimize the political power of the city of Philadelphia by refusing to
allow it to merge or expand into surrounding jurisdictions, and denying it additional
representatives.”); Anthony J. Gaughan, To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for
Reforming the Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States, 41 CAP. U. L. REV.
999, 1017 (2013) (“Gerry did not invent the practice. Politically-motivated redistricting dates
back to colonial Pennsylvania.”).
295. 369 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1962).
296. 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
297. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633-34 (1993).
298. Id. at 647.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 657-58.
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anything other than an effort to segregate ... voters on the basis of
race.”301 In a follow-up opinion, the Court explained that a state
violates equal protection when race is the “predominant factor mo-
tivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of
voters within or without a particular district.”302
Second, mapmakers have drawn boundaries based on political
lines—“packing” some districts with same-party voters and “crack-
ing” other districts populated by the opposing party.303 The majority
party will thus pool allies together in a stronghold district and
split the opposing party into diluted districts.304 As Professor Dan
Tokaji noted, “if elections are when voters choose their leaders,
redistricting is when leaders choose their voters.”305 Politicians gen-
erally draw lines that protect incumbents and their own political
parties.306 Unlike racial gerrymanders, however, the Supreme Court
has not yet reached a decisive solution on partisan gerrymanders.
The Court has taken up the issue several times without crafting a
judicially manageable test to evaluate when the practice violates
the Constitution.307 Litigation now swirls in the lower federal and
state courts, searching for a definitive standard and solution to
partisan gerrymandering.308
301. Id. at 646-47 (internal quotations omitted).
302. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). Justice Stevens dissented in this case,
arguing that the white voters who brought the claim did not suffer any cognizable injuries.
Id. at 932 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “I do not see how a districting plan that favors a politically
weak group can violate equal protection.” Id.; see also Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463
(2017) (holding that a state cannot justify a racial gerrymander by saying it was trying to
achieve a partisan advantage where race and party closely correlate).
303. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016); EDWARD B. FOLEY ET AL.,
ELECTION LAW AND LITIGATION: THE JUDICIAL REGULATION OF POLITICS 162 (2014).
304. See FOLEY ET AL., supra note 303, at 162.
305. DANIEL TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 77 (2016).
306. FOLEY ET AL., supra note 303, at 162.
307. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933-34 (2018); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 306 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986).
308. See, e.g., Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 927 (“Although the proposition is not settled in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, we hold ... that state legislatures cannot, consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause, adopt a districting plan that is intended to, and does in fact,
entrench a political party in power over the decennial period.”). In Whitford, Democratic
plaintiffs in Wisconsin alleged that the Republican-controlled state legislature enacted an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Id. at 843. A three-judge district panel agreed with
the plaintiffs’ claims, using an “efficiency gap” analysis developed by law professor Nicholas
Stephanopoulos and political scientist Eric McGhee, Research Fellow at the Public Policy
Institute of California. Id. at 910-27; see also ERIC PETRY, HOW THE EFFICIENCY GAP WORKS,
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Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence on gerrymandering reflects his
attitude toward equal protection generally. The Equal Protection
Clause protects individuals. And the Supreme Court had already
stated that American politicians represent people, not trees or
rocks—and certainly not majoritarian self-interest.309 If gerry-
mandering produced unequal representation, then the federal courts
had an obligation to intervene. The Equal Protection Clause pro-
tects American citizens no matter what cloak the gerrymander
wears. “Every gerrymander, indeed possibly every redistricting, is
at once ‘political,’ and therefore immune, and ‘discriminatory,’ and
therefore vulnerable.”310 The label simply did not matter for Justice
Stevens. After all, for him, there was only “one Equal Protection
Clause.”311 As Justice Stevens wrote:
The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional
gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on
assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their
purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the
districting process at the expense of any minority group, and
thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral
power.312
This “one Equal Protection Clause” offered all Americans an
impartial governance.
Yet if the line-drawing actually fostered better-proportioned
representation—especially to help minorities—then the Justice had
a more sympathetic attitude, whether the challenge to a map came
under the Equal Protection Clause or the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”).
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/How_
the_Efficiency_Gap_Standard_Works.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8NC-VEDB] (explaining the
efficiency gap). The Supreme Court, however, essentially rejected the basis for the efficiency
gap standard by ruling that a plaintiff does not have standing to bring a statewide claim. See
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1931.
309. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“Legislators represent people, not
trees or acres.”).
310. Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 847 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
311. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There is only
one Equal Protection Clause.... It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review
in some cases and a different standard in other cases.”); see also Note, Justice Stevens’s Equal
Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1146 n.3 (1987).
312. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 678 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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For Justice Stevens, the Equal Protection Clause requires the gov-
ernment to serve all citizens, especially the weak. If a racial ger-
rymander benefited the racial minority, Justice Stevens saw the
practice as embodying, not violating, the Equal Protection Clause.313
Accordingly, “[t]he duty to govern impartially is abused when a
group with power over the electoral process defines electoral bound-
aries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of
any weaker group.”314 Regarding race, this postulate means that the
majority could conceivably create districts along racial lines to boost
the representative power of underrepresented populations.315
In particular, Justice Stevens believed that courts should defer to
a law that specifically intends to benefit minorities, such as the
VRA.316 Early in his career on the Court, Justice Stevens argued
that the Court should ignore subjective intent and instead focus on
objective factors to determine whether a map suffered from unlawful
minority vote dilution under the VRA.317 As time progressed, Justice
Stevens adopted an expansive view of the VRA in the name of def-
erence to the legislative process. The Justice thought that the Court
should interpret the Act “in a manner that provides the broadest
possible scope in combating racial discrimination.”318 He developed
“workable” tests that generally furthered the interests of the dis-
enfranchised minority.319 At one point, Justice Scalia decried Jus-
tice Stevens’s efforts by noting that “the Voting Rights Act ... is not
some all-purpose weapon for well-intentioned judges to wield as
they please in the battle against discrimination.”320 Overall, Justice
Stevens’s views on the VRA show that his impartial governance
theory applies to both Equal Protection Clause and VRA redis-
tricting cases.321
313. Id. at 677-79.
314. Id. at 677-78.
315. Id. at 678 (“That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the
election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented
in the state legislature.”). 
316. See Karlan, supra note 43, at 535-37. 
317. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 637 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
318. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) (internal quotations omitted); see also
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 957-58 (1994) (Stevens, J., writing separately).
319. See Presley v. Etowah Cty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 523-24 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). 
320. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
321. In Shelby County v. Holder, decided after Justice Stevens retired, the Court struck
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In a post-retirement speech, Stevens remarked: “I do not under-
stand why a law designed to make different groups more equal
should violate the duty to govern impartially.”322 As a result, Justice
Stevens has been “less friendly to claims of racial ... gerrymander-
ing” when the white majority asserts that the legislature improper-
ly considered race to ensure adequate representation for the racial
minority.323
When it came to partisan gerrymanders, Justice Stevens was
even more adamant that the Court should use the Equal Protection
Clause to ensure impartial governance, especially for such a po-
litical act as drawing district lines.324 Justice Stevens criticized the
Court for its refusal to adopt any test whatsoever for partisan gerry-
manders, especially given that it had crafted a judicially manage-
able test for racial gerrymandering.325 In his mind, “so-called ‘racial
gerrymandering’ and ‘political gerrymandering’ must be judged
by the same constitutional standard.”326 The Court’s bifurcation
down portions of the VRA as, among other things, incompatible with the constitutional pre-
rogative of state sovereignty. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623-24, 2631 (2013) (“Not only do States retain
sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also a fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
among the States.... The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic principles.”)
(citations and quotations omitted). In an interview, Justice Stevens criticized the majority in
Shelby County for relying on equal sovereignty of the states while ignoring “the fact that
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution created a serious inequality among the states [in the
Three-Fifths Clause].” Andrew Cohen, John Paul Stevens on the Supreme Court’s Voting-
Rights Decision, ATLANTIC (July 20, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/
07/john-paul-stevens-on-the-supreme-courts-voting-rights-decision/277962/ [https://perma.cc/
YK7E-L8ZU]. Given his impartial governance theory, Justice Stevens naturally objected
because he feared that striking down this portion of the VRA would make it easier for certain
states with a history of discrimination not to govern impartially. Stevens concluded by quoting
Justice Scalia in another context: “This case is about power in several respects. It is about the
power of our people to govern themselves, and the power of this Court to pronounce the law.
Today’s opinion aggrandizes the latter, with the predictable consequence of diminishing the
former.” Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 778 (2013) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting)). Justice Stevens essentially used this quotation to drive home his impartial gov-
ernance theory regarding the VRA. He saw judicial activism in the majority’s Shelby County
opinion, which “gravely undercuts the Court’s eternal concerns about appearing impartial.”
Id.
322. Justice John Paul Stevens (Ret.), Originalism and History, 48 GA. L. REV. 691, 702
(2014).
323. Karlan, supra note 43, at 522.
324. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317-18 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 341.
326. Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 848 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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offended his “one Equal Protection Clause” sensibilities.327 Addi-
tionally, Justice Stevens balked at the Court’s inability to articulate
how partisan gerrymanders effectuated a harm just as much as
racial gerrymanders.328 Ever since his days on the Seventh Circuit,
then-Judge Stevens considered political gerrymandering as per-
nicious as racial gerrymandering.329 “[G]errymanders,” Justice Stev-
ens wrote, “effect a constitutional wrong when they disrupt the
representational norms that ordinarily tether elected officials to
their constituencies as a whole.”330 Justice Stevens believed that
a blatantly political gerrymander diluted democratic representa-
tion.331 When a gerrymander entrenched political majorities, sud-
denly cartographers, not voters, decided elections. Accordingly,
politicians would no longer feel beholden to their constituencies.
Instead, these politicians could simply redistrict such that they
faced no electoral pressure. As Justice Stevens later wrote: “[I]n
addition to the possibility that a representative may believe her job
is only to represent the interests of a dominant constituency, a
representative may feel more beholden to the cartographers who
drew her district than to the constituents who live there.”332 A
political gerrymander threatened impartial governance just as much
as a racial one. Given such a democratic distortion, political ger-
rymanders presented a problem that the judiciary should not
hesitate to correct. For Justice Stevens, “there can be no total
sanctuaries in the political thicket.”333
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer best
captures his thoughts on political gerrymanders334—and it may well
influence today’s partisan gerrymandering cases. That case consid-
ered the Pennsylvania General Assembly’s new legislative map in
response to the 2000 census.335 Plaintiffs, registered Democrats,
327. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
328. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 329-31, 341.
329. Cousins, 466 F.2d at 848; see also Stefanie A. Lindquist, Supreme Court Prequel:
Justice Stevens on the Seventh Circuit, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 715, 739 (2012).
330. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 329.
331. Id. at 331-32.
332. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 470 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
333. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 751 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
334. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317.
335. Id. at 272 (majority opinion).
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challenged the Republican-created map as violating the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.336 These Democrats accused the Republican state
legislature of ignoring traditional redistricting principles, including
“the preservation of local government boundaries,” and instead cre-
ating a map with “meandering and irregular” districts “solely for the
sake of partisan advantage.”337 Because of this gerrymander, the
Democratic plaintiffs claimed they experienced severe vote dilu-
tion.338
The Court had faced a similar claim in Davis v. Bandemer.339
There, Indiana Democratic voters filed a lawsuit against several
state officials “alleging that the 1981 reapportionment plans con-
stituted a political gerrymander intended to disadvantage Demo-
crats.”340 The Democrats brought the claim against the Republican
legislature under the Equal Protection Clause.341 A fractured Court
found political gerrymanders justiciable but failed to reach a
consensus on much else.342 Justice White’s plurality opinion held
that plaintiffs alleging partisan gerrymandering are “required to
prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable pol-
itical group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.”343
Justice Stevens joined Justice Powell’s separate opinion on the
proper standard to use.344 Relying heavily on Justice Stevens’s con-
currence in a previous one person, one vote case,345 Justice Powell
thought that more traditional principles should govern partisan
gerrymanders.346 Namely, Justice Powell stated that courts should
evaluate partisan gerrymanders based on “the shapes of voting
districts and adherence to established political subdivision bound-
aries.”347 Additionally, “[o]ther relevant considerations include the
nature of the legislative procedures by which the apportionment
336. Id.
337. Id. at 272-73.
338. Id. at 273, 297.
339. 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986) (plurality opinion).
340. Id. at 115.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 113, 143-44, 161.
343. Id. at 127.
344. Id. at 161-62 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
345. Id. at 165-66 (citing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755-59 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
346. Id. at 173.
347. Id.
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law was adopted and legislative history reflecting contemporane-
ous legislative goals.”348 The squabble between these two sides on
the search for a standard set three justices ill at ease. Justice
O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
argued that political gerrymanders presented a nonjusticiable is-
sue precisely because the Court was unable to formulate a judicial-
ly manageable standard that gained the assent of a majority.349
Thus, although a majority concluded that partisan gerrymandering
claims could proceed, the Court did not provide an identifiable
standard moving forward.
Vieth reopened the wound, with no prettier results. Once again
the Court splintered and failed to provide an overarching theory.
Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice Scalia categorically
found that political gerrymanders presented nonjusticiable issues.350
He concluded “that neither Article I, § 2, nor the Equal Protection
Clause, nor ... Article I, § 4, provides a judicially enforceable limit
on the political considerations that the States and Congress may
take into account when districting.”351 By contrast, although Justice
Kennedy agreed that this case under these theories proved non-
justiciable, he refused to shut the door decisively on judicial review
of all political gerrymanders.352 Maybe, he suggested, a manageable
standard would arise from the First Amendment (a stance Justice
Scalia decried as “never-say-never” jurisprudence).353
Justice Stevens sharply disagreed with the plurality’s refusal to
entertain the claim.354 “The concept of equal justice under law re-
quires the State to govern impartially,” Justice Stevens wrote.355 For
Justice Stevens, political gerrymanders violated this core concept.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 144, 147-48 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
350. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (plurality opinion).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 308-10 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Our willingness to enter the
political thicket of the apportionment process with respect to one-person, one-vote claims
makes it particularly difficult to justify a categorical refusal to entertain claims against this
other type of gerrymandering.”).
353. Id. at 314; id. at 303 (plurality opinion) (“The only cases Justice Kennedy cites in
defense of his never-say-never approach are Baker v. Carr and Bandemer.”).
354. Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t would be contrary to precedent and profoundly
unwise to foreclose all judicial review of similar claims that might be advanced in the
future.”).
355. Id.
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To him, impartiality mandated maps that had partisan neutrality
just as much as racial neutrality: “In my view, the same standards
should apply to claims of political gerrymandering, for the essence
of a gerrymander is the same regardless of whether the group is
identified as political or racial.”356 In fact, Justice Stevens argued
that the racial dilution cases should inform how the Court ap-
proaches political gerrymanders.357 For instance, invoking the racial
gerrymandering cases, Justice Stevens explained that “a district’s
peculiar shape might be a symptom of an illicit purpose in the line-
drawing process.”358 Justice Stevens trusted that a neutral judiciary
could import the standard into partisan gerrymandering cases. Even
though Justice Stevens, early in his career, experienced the judi-
ciary’s underbrush in the Illinois Supreme Court corruption scan-
dal,359 his confidence in judges never wavered. Justice Stevens
thought that federal judges could readily craft manageable judicial
standards to root out improper partisan gerrymandering. “[S]everal
standards for identifying impermissible partisan influence are
available to judges who have the will to enforce them,” he wrote.360
The Justice’s thoughts on the subject also stem from his attitudes
toward the two-party system and political entrenchment. Inoculat-
ing political gerrymanders from the federal courts would only
entrench the two-party system even more. Justice Stevens vehe-
mently opposed this idea. “It demeans the strength of the two-party
system to assume that the major parties need to rely on laws that
discriminate against independent voters and minor parties in order
to preserve their positions of power,” Justice Stevens wrote in an-
other context.361 In fact, “we have struck down state elections laws
specifically because they give ‘the two old, established parties a
decided advantage over any new parties struggling for existence.’”362
Perhaps most importantly for today’s partisan gerrymandering
cases, Justice Stevens espoused a district-by-district approach to
the issue, suggesting that plaintiffs could prevail once they showed
356. Id. at 335.
357. Id. at 326-27, 335-41.
358. Id. at 321.
359. MANASTER, supra note 173, at 37.
360. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 341.
361. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 381 (1997) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
362. Id. at 379 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968)).
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that politics were the predominant consideration behind their own
district lines.363 This contrasts with a theory of partisan gerryman-
dering that challenges the statewide map as a whole.364 Over a de-
cade after Justice Stevens espoused this theory, the Court unani-
mously embraced it in 2018, ruling in a challenge to Wisconsin’s
map that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they brought only
a statewide claim and lived in districts that themselves did not suf-
fer blatant partisan gerrymandering.365 The Court held that par-
tisan gerrymandering is a district-specific claim, and that plaintiffs
must live in the district to have standing and must litigate the claim
on a district-specific basis.366 Thus, the Court eventually vindicated
Justice Stevens’s views on the mechanics of a partisan gerryman-
dering claim.
Retirement has not silenced the Justice’s opinion on gerryman-
ders. In a post-retirement interview, Justice Stevens stated that
his views on gerrymandering go “back to the fundamental equal
protection principle that government has the duty to be impar-
tial.”367 “Nowadays,” he continued, “the political parties acknowl-
edge that they are deliberately trying to gerrymander the districts
in a way that will help the majority.... That’s outrageously unconsti-
tutional in my judgment.”368 Furthermore, Justice Stevens recently
called for a constitutional amendment banning the practice alto-
gether.369 The Justice even proposed his own language:
Districts represented by members of Congress, or by members
of any state legislative body, shall be compact and composed of
contiguous territory. The state shall have the burden of justify-
ing any departures from this requirement by reference to neu-
tral criteria such as natural, political, or historic boundaries or
demographic changes. The interest in enhancing or preserving
363. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 328-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
364. See, e.g., Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge
court) (striking down Wisconsin’s map under the efficiency gap, a statewide claim).
365. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929-31, 1933-34 (2018).
366. See id.
367. Kali Borkoski, An Interview with Justice Stevens, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 3, 2011, 3:10
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/an-interview-with-justice-stevens/ [https://perma.cc/
3TYG-7E3C].
368. Id.
369. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE
CONSTITUTION 54-55 (2014).
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the political power of the party in control of the state govern-
ment is not such a neutral criterion.370
Several decades after espousing an impartial governance theory
as applied to partisan gerrymandering and focusing on the district-
specific nature of the harm—first in Davis and again in Vieth—Jus-
tice Stevens’s overarching jurisprudential standard has started to
gain traction. Although Justice Kennedy most vociferously promoted
a First Amendment approach to partisan gerrymanders,371 Justice
Stevens also invoked the First Amendment as a potential standard,
and his underlying impartiality rationale has endured.372 That the-
ory, along with his now-vindicated district-specific approach, could
have a major influence in today’s biggest gerrymandering disputes.
C. Campaign Finance
Unlike in election administration—where he created the main
test—or legislative districting—where his approach to partisan ger-
rymandering is just now starting to gain steam—Justice Stevens
had a more modest influence on the world of campaign finance.
Indeed, Justice Stevens’s most significant and well-known contribu-
tion came in dissent. Yet his approach has helped to frame the
debate and spark vigorous opposition. And much like in the other
areas of the law of democracy, he stayed consistent in grounding his
approach in a theory of impartial governance.
Citizens United v. FEC represents the Supreme Court’s most
controversial opinion on campaign finance to date.373 The case has
370. Id. at 55.
371. Robert Yablon, Voting, Spending, and the Right to Participate, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 655,
682 (2017) (“Justice Kennedy, for instance, has written in the context of partisan
gerrymandering that ‘First Amendment concerns arise where a State enacts a law that has
the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their party to disfavored treatment
by reason of their views.’” (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment))); see also Lori A. Ringhand, Voter Viewpoint Discrimination: A
First Amendment Challenge to Voter Participation Restrictions, 13 ELECTION L.J. 288, 293
(2014); Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting is Association, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 790-91 (2016).
372. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 294 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Justice Stevens relies
on First Amendment cases to suggest that politically discriminatory gerrymanders are subject
to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
373. See Gabrielle Levy, How Citizens United Has Changed Politics in 5 Years, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. (Jan. 21, 2015, 12:26 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/21/5-
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produced numerous scholarly articles,374 heated political rhetoric,375
and even a notoriously tense exchange between Justice Samuel
Alito and President Barack Obama during the President’s State of
the Union address shortly after the decision came down.376 No won-
der the case produced the longest opinion ever penned by even the
prolific John Paul Stevens.377
Yet before he knew defeat, Justice Stevens knew victory: by writ-
ing a majority opinion upholding various campaign finance regu-
lations and, more importantly, crafting a theory of impartial gov-
ernance for the government’s ability to regulate money in politics.
In 2002, Senators John McCain and Russ Feingold successfully
engineered the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(McCain-Feingold).378 McCain-Feingold addressed the increased
role of “soft money” in political campaigns.379 “Soft money” included
donations directly to national political parties that the party would
use for get-out-the-vote and other party-building efforts, but in
reality benefited specific candidates.380 Congress found that these
soft money donations were effectively circumventing the contribu-
tion limits the Court had upheld in its seminal decision in Buckley
v. Valeo.381 If a person wanted to give money outside of the contribu-
tion limits to his or her preferred candidate, the donor could simply
years-later-citizens-united-has-remade-us-politics [https://perma.cc/8LTP-FFEV].
374. See Robert G. Boatright & Molly Brigid Flynn, The Poverty of “Corruption”: On
Reframing the Debate on Money in Politics, 9 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 341, 342-43 (2016);
Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J.
412, 417-18 (2013).
375. See, e.g., Benjamin Oreskes, Clinton Pledges Constitutional Amendment to Overturn
Citizens United Ruling, POLITICO (July 16, 2016, 1:28 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/
2016/07/hillary-clinton-citizens-united-225658 [https://perma.cc/V55G-63N2].
376. See Robert Barnes, Reactions Split on Obama’s Remark, Alito’s Response at State of
the Union, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/01/28/AR2010012802893.html [https://perma.cc/7ZQC-C8JT].
377. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 393 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited, NEW YORKER (May 21, 2012), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/money-unlimited [https://perma.cc/U2QG-4QH8].
378. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
379. See Major Provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, FED. ELEC.
COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/bcra_overview.shtml [https://perma.cc/R6U2-MKU5].
380. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122-26 (2003) (joint opinion of Stevens and
O’Connor, JJ.), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
381. See id. at 126; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-38 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding as
constitutional various Federal Election Campaign Act provisions limiting contributions to
campaigns).
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donate the money to a political party committee, knowing the
committee would spend it to help the candidate. McCain-Feingold
also targeted the rise of issue advocacy advertising. For instance,
the bill contained provisions that prevented corporations from
issuing “electioneering communications”—defined as any communi-
cation “expressly advocating the election or defeat of particular can-
didates”—within thirty days of a primary/caucus or sixty days of a
general election.382
Then-Senate Majority Whip Mitch McConnell led a constitutional
attack on McCain-Feingold, using the language from Buckley to
argue that the law unconstitutionally infringed free speech.383 In a
joint opinion by Justices Stevens and O’Connor, the Supreme Court
turned back the assault.384 “Money, like water, will always find an
outlet,” they wrote.385 Accordingly, Congress had taken necessary
remedial steps to prevent “both ... actual corruption ... and ... the
appearance of corruption.”386 More importantly, Justice Stevens
espoused a broad view of corruption that Congress could act to
prevent. More than just quid pro quo exchanges, Justice Stevens
worried that large donations could lead to ingratiation and undue
access for the donor. As he and Justice O’Connor wrote, “[i]t is not
only plausible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for
such [soft money] donations [to national political parties] and that
donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.”387 Justice Stevens
believed that a member of Congress would feel certain obligations
to a wealthy donor who gave to the national party knowing that the
party would use this soft money to help the candidate during the
election. Corporations or other large entities also should not be able
to use their larger megaphones to influence a campaign soon before
Election Day. This viewpoint is consistent with how Justice Stevens
formulated his impartial governance theory of democracy. For Jus-
tice Stevens, wealthy donors should not have better access to a Con-
gress member’s ear, regardless of whether the corruption (or its
appearance) came from direct quid pro quo exchanges or a broader
382. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189-90 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2012)).
383. See id. at 134.
384. Id. at 114, 223-24.
385. Id. at 224.
386. Id. at 136 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)).
387. Id. at 145.
2018] A VOICE IN THE WILDERNESS 389
understanding of undue access.388 Similarly, he thought that corpo-
rations—much like the majority that draws legislative districts—
should not have an outsized voice in a political campaign.
Samuel Alito replaced Sandra Day O’Connor on the Court in
2006.389 A few years later, in Citizens United, the Justices revisited
the “electioneering communication” issue it had faced in McConnell;
this time, without his McConnell coauthor on the Court, Justice
Stevens found himself in dissent.390
During the 2008 election, a corporation known as Citizens United
wanted to broadcast a film called Hillary: The Movie. The film
directly attacked Hillary Clinton, a presidential candidate in the
2008 Democratic primaries. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,
however, would classify Hillary: The Movie as an “electioneering
communication,” which the law would prohibit during the election
windows.391 Citizens United filed suit against the Federal Election
Commission in federal court, at first arguing narrowly that the
movie should not fall within the statutory definition of “electioneer-
ing communication” and then, at the Supreme Court’s prompting,
arguing that the law was facially invalid. After two oral arguments,
the Supreme Court issued a broad opinion that struck down this
part of McCain-Feingold and the McConnell precedent upholding
it.392 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated:
The Government has “muffle[d] the voices that best represent
the most significant segments of the economy.” And “the elec-
torate [has been] deprived of information, knowledge and
opinion vital to its function.” By suppressing the speech of
manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Gov-
ernment prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the
public and advising voters on which persons or entities are
hostile to their interests.393
388. Id. at 150-52, 223-24.
389. David Stout, Alito is Sworn in as Justice After 58-42 Vote to Confirm Him, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 31, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/politics/politicsspecial1/alito-is-sworn-in-
as-justice-after-5842-vote-to.html [https://perma.cc/A7BA-4UW7].
390. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 393 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
391. See The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(2002); Toobin, supra note 377.
392. Id. at 354 (2010) (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
393. Id. at 354 (majority opinion) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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Justice Stevens watched with consternation as his approach in
McConnell burned. “Today’s decision is backwards in many senses,”
Justice Stevens asserted in his lengthy dissent.394 He accused the
majority of elevating a personal “agenda over the litigants’ submis-
sions.”395 “[F]ive Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of
the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an
opportunity to change the law.”396 Seeing the storm clouds on the
horizon in an earlier case, Justice Stevens had warned that using
the First Amendment to invalidate campaign finance laws would re-
semble the substantive due process doctrines that conservatives ab-
horred.397 That day had now come. The liberal Justice who professed
opposition to judicial activism balked at what he perceived was an
immense overreach.398 The Court, he said, should have decided
simply whether Hillary: The Movie fell within McCain-Feingold’s
“electioneering communication” provision and left it at that.
Even beyond the Court’s judicial overreach, however, Justice
Stevens had problems with what he saw as the Court’s blithe ob-
fuscation of individuals and corporations—especially because it
conflicted with his theory of impartial governance. McCain-Feingold
regulated only “electioneering communications” funded via corpo-
rations or other entities. Yet “[t]he Framers ... took it as a given
that corporations could be comprehensively regulated in the service
of the public welfare.”399 Thus, “[a]t bottom, the Court’s opinion is
... a rejection of the common sense of the American people, who
have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining
394. Id. at 478 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
395. Id.
396. Id. at 398.
397. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398-99 (2000) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) (“Money is property; it is not speech.... The right to use one’s own money to hire
gladiators, or to fund ‘speech by proxy,’ certainly merits significant constitutional protection.
These property rights, however, are not entitled to the same protection as the right to say
what one pleases.”).
398. See Toobin, supra note 377 (“In some ways, Stevens’s greatest objections were proced-
ural.... [I]t was especially galling that the Court converted Citizens United from a narrow
dispute ... to an assault on a century of federal laws and precedents. To Stevens, it was the
purest kind of judicial activism.”).
399. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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self-government since the founding.”400 For Justice Stevens, the
government’s interest in preventing corruption justified limits on
corporate contributions and expenditures. That is because undue
influence of the wealthy would necessarily come at the expense of
the less privileged, undermining an impartial governance notion
of democratic participation.
Of course, Justice Stevens was in dissent, so his views have not
taken hold as binding precedent. But his dissent inspired at least
one court. In Stop This Insanity, Inc. v. FEC, Judge Beryl A. Howell
of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
tracked Justice Stevens’s thought process in Citizens United.401
Judge Howell determined that the government could limit contri-
butions to certain political advocacy groups; these groups not only
engaged in traditional political advocacy, but also made direct con-
tributions to candidates.402 Judge Howell found that the government
had a significantly important anticorruption interest to impose such
restrictions:
To conclude that a “hybrid” PAC’s direct contributions to (and
attendant coordination with) candidates and parties do not in-
fect, or appear to infect, all of its operations in the political arena
is naïve and simply out of touch with the American public’s clear
disillusionment with the massive amounts of private money that
have dominated the political system, particularly since Citizens
United.403
Judge Howell cited Justice Stevens’s dissent in Citizens United
several times to justify this approach.404 “As Justice Stevens noted
in his piercing dissent,” Judge Howell wrote, “laws such as [the
FECA] do not merely pit the anticorruption interest against the
First Amendment, but also pit competing First Amendment values
against each other.”405 Ultimately, “[a] democracy cannot function
effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being
400. Id. at 479.
401. See 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 26, 47-48 (D.D.C. 2012).
402. Id. at 40.
403. Id. at 44 (footnote omitted) (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 452-53 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
404. Id. at 40, 44, 47-48.
405. Id. at 47-48 (alterations in original) (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 473).
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bought and sold.”406 Such an idea disrupted a theory of impartial
governance because it cut against the notion that representatives
will do as their constituents—and not just as their wealthy donors—
will want.
As with partisan gerrymanders, retirement has not stopped
Justice Stevens’s crusade against campaign finance deregulation.
He proposed a constitutional amendment that would solve the
pernicious problems he perceives in this area:
Neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of this
Constitution shall be construed to prohibit the Congress or any
state from imposing reasonable limits on the amount of money
that candidates for public office, or their supporters, may spend
in election campaigns.407
Both the Stop This Insanity opinion and his proposed constitu-
tional amendment nicely encapsulate Justice Stevens’s thoughts in
this area. First, Justice Stevens never followed the logic in Buckley
that money represented speech. As he wrote in another campaign
finance case:
Money is property; it is not speech. Speech has the power to
inspire volunteers to perform a multitude of tasks on a campaign
trail, on a battleground, or even on a football field. Money,
meanwhile, has the power to pay hired laborers to perform the
same tasks. It does not follow, however, that the First Amend-
ment provides the same measure of protection to the use of
money to accomplish such goals as it provides to the use of ideas
to achieve the same results.408
If money represents property rather than speech, then the gov-
ernment naturally has wider latitude to prescribe restrictions on
campaign expenditures.409 An impartial government, for Justice
Stevens, does not bend toward those with more money but rather
406. Id. at 44 (quoting Citizens United 558 U.S. at 453).
407. STEVENS, supra note 369, at 79.
408. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
409. Cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488-89 (2005) (“[W]e also decline to
second-guess the City's determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to ef-
fectuate the project.”).
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sets clear boundaries that equally benefit the impoverished and the
wealthy.
Second, the Justice considered elections “a species of debate be-
tween two adversaries.”410 Accordingly, equalizing time and money
between two candidates made perfect sense to him. Otherwise, Jus-
tice Stevens wrote, an appellate procedure rule equalizing the time
between two oral advocates would also run afoul of the First Amend-
ment.411 If courts can impose valid limits on that speech, then re-
strictions on campaign contributions easily follow suit. For Justice
Stevens, these kinds of campaign finance limits are the only way to
ensure that our representative democracy is an impartial one.412
An impartial governance theory of campaign finance requires a
roughly equal playing field among both candidates and donors. For
Justice Stevens, no one should have better access to the ears of a
legislator, at least not because of campaign expenditures that help-
ed that representative win and stay in office. Candidates themselves
should compete on a mostly equal playing field. He believed that we
can have a strong democratic system only if the government is
allowed to ensure that elections are fair and that legislation is not
the result of undue influence from donors. Even the appearance of
this impropriety harms the ideals of impartial governance because
the general public will think that money, and not the best ideas and
policy positions, is winning the day. Justice Stevens’s overarching
principle of impartial governance meant that the Court should
uphold laws that limit this improper influence, much in the same
way that this same theory forbids drawing unfair lines in the re-
districting context that improperly favor the ruling class. None of
this is to say that Justice Stevens was necessarily correct in his
410. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 138 (2011).
411. Id.
412. See id. Although Justice Stevens was in dissent in Citizens United, the experiences
of other Western democracies track his views. Both Great Britain and Canada have strict
campaign spending limits. See RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 121-22 (2016). One study
showed that Canada, with its strict spending limits, has had far higher rates of incumbent
turnover in its House of Commons than the U.S. House of Representatives has experienced
during the same time period. See Anthony J. Gaughan, The Forty-Year War on Money in
Politics: Watergate, FECA, and the Future of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 791,
836 (2016).
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analysis, but only that he espoused a consistent theory to explain
why he believed the government could regulate money in politics.
Justice Stevens’s theory for campaign finance is also consistent
with his analysis for other areas of the law of democracy: judges
should police election laws that fail to ensure impartiality in the
democratic process. But courts should defer to legislatures when
they enact rules that foster greater competition, dislodge entrench-
ment, or help the political minority. That approach to campaign
finance has not won the day with the current Supreme Court. Yet
Justice Stevens’s writing in this area has helped to frame that de-
bate—itself an important contribution to election law over the past
several decades.
Moreover, Justice Stevens’s views have influenced the public
debate. “Overturn[ ] Citizens United” became a rallying cry for 2016
Democratic presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Bernie
Sanders, with both of them suggesting that they would appoint
Supreme Court justices who would reverse the decision.413 Grass-
roots organizations have cropped up with their sole goal of minimiz-
ing the influence of large moneyed interests in elections.414 Cam-
paign finance reformers have sought ways to reduce the cost of
running a campaign.415 These movements implicitly derive their
message from Justice Stevens’s theory of impartial governance.
D. Deciding a Presidential Election
The fictional Chicago bartender Mr. Dooley once observed: “no
matther whether th’ constitution follows th’ flag or not, th’ supreme
coort follows th’ iliction returns.”416 In December 2000, however, the
413. Peter Overby, Presidential Candidates Pledge to Undo ‘Citizens United.’ But
Can They?, NPR (Feb. 14, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/02/14/466668949/
presidential-candidates-pledge-to-undo-citizens-united-but-can-they [https://perma.cc/M6GQ-
BWGU].
414. Peter Overby, Once Ruled by Washington Insiders, Campaign Finance Reform Goes
Grass Roots, NPR (Apr. 4, 2016, 4:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/04/ 473005036/once-
ruled-by-washington-insiders-campaign-finance-reform-goes-grassroots [https://perma.cc /L7
ZU-5WXL].
415. See Steven Hill, How to Minimize Money’s Role in Politics, 95 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 17, 17
(2006).
416. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901), quoted in Pamela S. Karlan,
The Partisan of Nonpartisanship: Justice Stevens and the Law of Democracy, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2187, 2187 (2006).
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Supreme Court flipped this aphorism upside down: With Bush v.
Gore, “the election returns followed the Supreme Court.”417 Ever
since Baker v. Carr, many observers predicted that it was only a
matter of time before the Supreme Court arbitrated a national elec-
tion.418 That finally happened in 2000 in Bush v. Gore.419 Justice
Stevens led the Court’s response for the liberal wing of the Court,
and in doing so, he focused on the role of a judge to remain impartial
even in the most partisan of disputes.420 Given that he was in
dissent, Justice Stevens’s approach obviously did not have much
real-world impact. But just like in Citizens United, his opinion
showed the consistency by which he strived for an impartial
governance theory to election law, with impartial judges at the
forefront.
Even before that dispute, Justice Stevens’s own history on the
Seventh Circuit foreshadowed his approach to the questions sur-
rounding a post-election contest. In Hartke v. Roudebush, a special
three-judge district court, which included then-Judge Stevens of the
Seventh Circuit, considered whether to prevent Indiana from
recounting a disputed U.S. Senate race.421 Although two judges
agreed with the winning candidate to stop the recount, stating that
an election contest was permissible only in the U.S. Senate itself,
Judge Stevens dissented.422 He believed that state election officials
and the state judiciary could impartially resolve any questions over
the recount without usurping the Senate’s ultimate role in deter-
mining election contests.423 As Judge Stevens wrote in his dissent,
[T]he exercise of “judgment” by state election officials at various
stages of the counting and recounting of ballots does not invade
the Senate’s power to make the final judgment on the outcome.
The evidence establishes without contradiction that the Indiana
recount procedures have integrity, that the original ballots and
417. Karlan, supra note 416, at 2187.
418. See, e.g., FOLEY, supra note 287, at 233-34; Nelson Lund, From Baker v. Carr to Bush
v. Gore, and Back, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 947, 947 (2012).
419. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
420. Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
421. Hartke v. Roudebush, 321 F. Supp. 1370, 1370-72 (S.D. Ind. 1970) (three-judge court),
rev’d, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). 
422. Id. at 1373, 1376; id. at 1378 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
423. Id. at 1378.
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other records are carefully preserved for future study, that an
adequate record of what transpires during a recount is main-
tained, and that any judgment as to whether or not certain
categories of ballots (or even individual ballots) should be
counted, may be reviewed subsequently by the body having the
power finally to resolve an election contest.424
Moreover, the Indiana courts could adequately resolve any dis-
putes over these procedures.425 Impartial election officials and im-
partial judges were the best solution to potential partisan overreach
in a close election. The Supreme Court agreed with Judge Stevens
and reversed the decision.426
Twenty-eight years later and thirty-eight years after the Sup-
reme Court originally entered the political thicket through Baker v.
Carr, Justice Stevens and his colleagues faced a similar dilemma,
but this time it involved the higher-stakes, near-constitutional crisis
surrounding the 2000 presidential election.427 Justice Stevens’s po-
sition remained the same: the federal judiciary should trust state
judges to implement the election procedures fairly.428 Yet once again
he found himself in dissent.429
The controversy started innocently enough. Even before polls
opened on November 7, 2000, politicos predicted a tight race be-
tween Texas Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Al
Gore.430 When polls closed, commentators declared Florida—and
thus the outcome of the entire election—“too close to call.”431 Then,
the networks deigned George W. Bush the winner in Florida by a
slim margin, thereby giving him the presidency.432
424. Id.
425. Id. (“Nor has there been any suggestion that the Indiana judiciary is not perfectly
capable of handling Indiana litigation without assistance or interference from a federal
district court.”).
426. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 23, 26 (1972).
427. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
428. Id. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
429. Id. at 123.
430. Richard L. Berke & Janet Elder, The 2000 Campaign: The Polls; Poll Shows Either
Candidate Within Reach of Victory, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/
11/06/us/the-2000-campaign-the-polls-poll-shows-either-candidate-within-reach-of-
victory.html [https://perma.cc/H7R6-4826].
431. FOLEY ET AL., supra note 303, at 719.
432. See Jeffrey Toobin, Precedent and Prologue, NEW YORKER (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2010/12/06/precedent-and-prologue [https://perma.cc/KHN4-FHZL].
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 Yet both sides discovered significant problems in the ballot-
casting and counting process. Apparently, many elderly voters in
Palm Beach County, Florida accidentally voted for Pat Buchanan
instead of Al Gore because of the so-called “butterfly ballot,” which
listed candidates close together on both sides of a central punch
card and therefore confused voters.433 But there was no legal rem-
edy for this confusion. More significantly, election machines did not
register many ballots because the “chads” that voters were supposed
to punch out to indicate their choice either did not become com-
pletely dislodged (“hanging chads”) or had barely been dislodged in
the first place (“dimpled chads”). Litigation naturally ensued. The
Florida state courts, interpreting Florida election law, ordered a
manual recount of all “undervotes” and “overvotes.”434 “Undervotes”
included ballots with no Presidential preference—namely, the
“hanging” and “dimpled” chads—while “overvotes” constituted those
ballots where the machine indicated more than one candidate mark-
ed for president. The Florida Supreme Court provided only one
standard for the recount: the “clear indication of the intent of the
voter.”435
Rapid developments followed. The day after the Florida Supreme
Court ordered the recount, the United States Supreme Court issued
an emergency stay blocking the recount from going forward.436 Two
days later, the Court heard oral argument on the merits.437 George
W. Bush’s legal team argued that the Florida Supreme Court’s
vague “clear intent of the voter” standard violated the Equal
Protection Clause.438 “Intent of the voter,” Bush claimed, was too
ephemeral for a statewide recount; thus, votes would not be equally
counted.439 The Supreme Court agreed.440 In an opinion handed
down the very next day, the Supreme Court permanently halted
433. FOLEY ET AL., supra note 303, at 720.
434. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247, 1262 (Fla. 2000).
435. Id. at 1257.
436. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000) (issuing the stay on Dec. 9, 2000).
437. See Linda Greenhouse, Bush v. Gore is Now in Hands of Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 11, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/11/us/contesting-the-vote-the-overview-bush-
v-gore-is-now-in-hands-of-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/C9QK-7QWF].
438. Oral Argument at 00:19:52, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), https://
www.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-949 [https://perma.cc/55LP-JPTF] (“You say the intent of the
voter is not good enough.” (statement of Breyer, J.)).
439. See id. at 21:04.
440. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam).
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the recount.441 The Court found that the state could not conduct a
constitutionally valid recount in time to meet Florida’s statutory
deadline for certifying presidential electors.442 By a five-four vote,
the Supreme Court ended the controversy, essentially deciding the
election in favor of George W. Bush.
Justice Stevens dissented.443 Despite his opposition to judicial
non-intervention in general, Justice Stevens took umbrage with the
Court meddling in the state courts’ post-election procedures. The
Florida Supreme Court already “did what courts do—it decided the
case before it in light of the legislature’s intent to leave no legally
cast vote uncounted.”444 The United States Supreme Court had no
business interfering with a state-based issue that “does not even
raise a colorable federal question.”445 In fact, for Justice Stevens, the
entire majority opinion reeked of judicial activism and inappropri-
ate bench legislation given that the state courts had already passed
upon the issues. “On questions of state law, we have consistently re-
spected the opinions of the highest courts of the States,” he wrote.446
Justice Stevens believed that the Court should have done so in Bush
v. Gore as well.
Accordingly, Justice Stevens professed complete faith in state
court judges to oversee the ballot-counting process. Justice Stev-
ens blatantly assumed “that the members of [the Florida Sup-
reme Court] and the judges who would have carried out its mandate
are impartial.”447 “It is confidence in the men and women who
administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule
of law,” Justice Stevens wrote.448 For him, Bush v. Gore damaged
this confidence. “The endorsement of that [lack of confidence] by
the majority of this Court can only lend credence to the most cynical
appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land,” he con-
cluded.449
441. Id. at 110-11.
442. See id. at 110.
443. See id. at 123 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
444. Id. at 128 (footnote omitted). 
445. Id.
446. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (order for stay).
447. Bush, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
448. Id.
449. Id.
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Placing confidence in state judges to resolve this case furthered
Justice Stevens’s view of impartial governance because it left the
decision to those who were closest to the dispute and the evidence,
and to whom he believed would be truly impartial. Of course,
Justice Stevens’s experience with the corrupt Illinois judicial sys-
tem gave him ample reason to distrust state judges.450 During his
investigation of two Illinois Supreme Court justices, he witnessed
just how untrustworthy state court judges—particularly elected
state judges—could prove in practice.451 Yet Justice Stevens had
unflagging faith in the judicial system as a whole. At a young age,
Justice Stevens saw appellate judges do what an emotionally-
charged jury could not: decide an issue involving his father’s crim-
inal conviction based upon facts and evidence.452 As Jeffrey Toobin
noted, the exoneration of Ernest Stevens left “[an] influence ...
greater than Stevens acknowledges. His jurisprudence is distin-
guished by his confidence in the ability of judges to resolve difficult
issues.”453 Justice Stevens certainly witnessed corrupt and partial
judges but, more importantly, he also saw the social value in ulti-
mately trusting the judiciary to do the right thing. Former Justice
Stevens clerk Deborah Pearlstein wrote: “Whether you take the
examples from [Justice Stevens’s] personal life, or the litany of cases
he’s heard in decades on the bench, his reliance on and confidence
in judges to find out the truth was pretty unswerving.”454
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bush v. Gore grappled with how best
to resolve a highly partisan dispute so as to achieve, as much as pos-
sible, impartial governance. He expressed concern at the possible
arbitrary—and subjective—vote counting process. “Admittedly,” he
stated, “the use of differing substandards for determining voter
intent in different counties employing similar voting systems may
raise serious concerns.”455 However, Justice Stevens found his con-
cerns alleviated “by the fact that a single impartial magistrate will
ultimately adjudicate all objections arising from the recount
450. See supra Part II.
451. See supra text accompanying notes 176-98.
452. See Toobin, supra note 6; see also supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
453. Toobin, supra note 6.
454. Id.
455. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 126 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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process.”456 Judges decided cases impartially, almost as an ontol-
ogical fact; an experience with a few bad apples did not poison
Justice Stevens’s perception. Justice Stevens insisted that “we have
consistently respected the opinions of the highest courts of the
States.”457 In the end, the Justice found confidence in the judiciary
more important than any previous incompetence he had witnessed
in the state courts. He concluded, “Although we may never know
with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s
Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is
the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the
rule of law.”458
Accordingly, Justice Stevens thought that the U.S. Supreme
Court did not need to resolve the dispute because the Florida Sup-
reme Court had already settled the matter. The Justice could find
no evidence of partiality in the state court’s decision. Thus, involve-
ment at the federal court level suspiciously resembled a blatantly
partisan tactic to achieve a different result, rather than a reasoned
measure to ensure impartial democratic governance. To those who
might say that Justice Stevens’s vote itself was partisan in favor-
ing Gore, Justice Stevens would likely retort that his dissent em-
bodied an impartial governance theory that permeated his election
law jurisprudence. Reversing the Florida Supreme Court, which did
what courts regularly do, was to Justice Stevens the partisan act
that impugned impartial governance.
For Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court’s capitulation in such
partisan parlor games severely damaged the impartial governance
theory on two levels. First, the Court unnecessarily cast a shadow
over the impartiality of state judges. Second—and more damn-
ingly—resolving the dispute in Bush v. Gore at the federal level
damaged the Supreme Court’s own impartial bona fides. Even
twelve years later, disgruntled observers still argued that the Court
“stole” the election in George W. Bush’s favor.459 Even more telling,
456. Id. (emphasis added).
457. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (order for stay).
458. Bush, 531 U.S. at 128-29.
459. See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Yes, Bush v. Gore Did Steal the Election, N.Y. MAG. (June
25, 2012, 12:41 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/06/yes-bush-v-gore-did-steal-
the-election.html [https://perma.cc/L2B3-K79G].
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however, is how the Court itself has used the case since it came
down. As Jeffrey Toobin noted:
Momentous Supreme Court cases tend to move quickly into the
slipstream of the Court’s history. In the first ten years after
Brown v. Board of Education ... the Justices cited the case more
than twenty-five times. In the ten years after Roe v. Wade ...
there were more than sixty-five references to that landmark....
Over [a] decade [later], the Justices have provided a verdict of
sorts on Bush v. Gore by the number of times they have cited it:
zero.460
Of course, Bush v. Gore was, in many ways, sui generis, so it may
not be all that surprising that the Court has not relied on it again.
Yet the very nature of the case as a one-off decision to decide an
election underscores one of Justice Stevens’s main points: the Court
suffered reputational harms by not staying out of the dispute, as the
public saw the case as political and inconsistent with impartial gov-
ernance. Thus, although Justice Stevens’s decision itself in Bush v.
Gore did not necessarily have a major impact, his approach in the
case showed how he consistently trusted impartial judges to serve
as neutral arbiters in the most partisan of situations. It is this the-
ory of impartial governance that animated Justice Stevens’s time on
the Court.
* * * 
Election law scholars have found it difficult to reconcile the var-
ious strands of the doctrine. Is there a consistent judicial approach
to election administration, redistricting, campaign finance, or even
resolving a post-election dispute? Although he might not have said
so explicitly, Justice Stevens saw a way: through a theory of
impartial governance that placed faith in judges to uphold the ideals
of a fair democratic process.
460. Toobin, supra note 432. Since Toobin’s writing, Justice Thomas cited Bush v. Gore in
a dissenting opinion, albeit for a routine proposition. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of
Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2268-69 n.2 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting). But otherwise the
Court has not cited the case.
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As part of an impartial governance theory, Justice Stevens
strongly opposed political entrenchment. Entrenchment, for him,
stands directly against the ideal of an impartial government. Jus-
tice Stevens envisioned a robust democracy with strong competi-
tion on every wing. “[A] central theme of our jurisprudence,” he
wrote, is “that the entire electorate ... will benefit from robust com-
petition in ideas and governmental policies that ‘is at the core of our
electoral process.’”461 In particular, Justice Stevens opposed laws
that entrenched the two-party system. The paradoxical liberal Re-
publican found himself increasingly displaced as his own party grew
more and more conservative. The Justice skeptically scrutinized
laws that benefited the two-party system, especially when minor
parties suffered as a result.462 For Justice Stevens, governing
officials had a duty not to entrench their own views but instead to
govern impartially, even if doing so risked electoral defeat.
To uphold impartial governance, Justice Stevens promoted an
unflagging confidence in the judiciary. As former Justice Stevens
clerk Andrew Siegel notes, “[t]he glue holding together [Justice
Stevens’s decision-making process] is judicial judgment.”463 Former
Justice Stevens clerk Deborah Pearlstein agreed: “Generally, he
respects the heck out of the profession of which he’s a member.”464
This strand from Justice Stevens’s opinions led Jeffrey Toobin to
conclude that Justice Stevens’s “jurisprudence is distinguished by
his confidence in the ability of judges to resolve difficult issues.”465
Nowhere do more fundamentally difficult issues appear than in
election law, which gives the judiciary a unique role in shaping
American democracy in an impartial manner.
CONCLUSION
Election law has grown into one of the most controversial areas
in the American legal system. Justice John Paul Stevens—who was
461. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 382 (1997) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 802 (1983)).
462. As he wrote, “[a] burden that falls unequally on new or small political parties or on
independent candidates impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices protected by the
First Amendment.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793-94.
463. Toobin, supra note 6.
464. Id.
465. Id.
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particularly prolific on this topic and crafted the crucial test for elec-
tion administration and the right to vote that is still used today—
had a significant impact on the field. Justice Stevens’s approach to
judicial review of the law of democracy, when applied properly to
focus on rooting out partisanship in election rules, can help to rec-
oncile the difficult conundrums that all election law cases present:
the clash of rights between individual voters and the state to reg-
ulate elections; the ability of the legislature to draw district lines
while not aggrandizing its power or unduly favoring the majority;
the need for First Amendment space to spend money in elections
while allowing governments to regulate campaign finance to pro-
mote fairness. Justice Stevens approached election law with one
idea in mind: Governments should rule impartially. A democracy
functioned best when the government neither favored nor disfavored
groups and when the governing officials advanced the interests of
the governed rather than their own. As historians consider this
storied jurist’s legacy, election law, the impartial governance theory,
and a trust in the judiciary to ensure fairness should stand out.
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APPENDIX: JUSTICE STEVENS’S ELECTION LAW OPINIONS 466
Case Name
Justice
Stevens’s
Disposition
Court’s Holding Justice Stevens’s Views
Bradley v.
Lunding, 424
U.S. 1309
(1976)
Order for the
Court as
Circuit
Justice
An Illinois
regulation that
“prescribes a
lottery system for
breaking ties
resulting from the
simultaneous
filing of petitions
for nomination to
elective office”
features no
infirmities.
The regulation offered an
equal chance of receiving a
favorable or unfavorable
placement on the ballot.
Accordingly, Justice Stevens
found “insufficient indication
of unfairness or irreparable
injury to warrant the issuance
of a stay against enforcement
of the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Illinois.”
Mandel v.
Bradley, 432
U.S. 173
(1977)
Dissenting
Prior summary
affirmance in a
similar case
should not be
construed as
supporting the
proposition that
early filing dates
are
unconstitutionally
burdensome on an
independent
candidate’s access
to the ballot.
Justice Stevens thought that
the early filing date unfairly
discriminated against
independent candidates by
requiring that these
candidates make the decision
to run for office much sooner
than members of national
political parties.
466. This list reflects all Supreme Court cases involving election administration,
redistricting, ballot access, and campaign finance in which Justice Stevens wrote an opinion.
We did not include cases involving union elections or that had only an incidental connection
to the electoral system.
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United States
v. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 435
U.S. 110
(1978)
Dissenting
The Voting Rights
Act requires that
all entities having
power over any
aspects of the
electoral process
within designated
jurisdictions
obtain prior
federal approval
before changing
voting practices or
procedures.
The Voting Rights Act only
covers designated States and
their “political subdivisions.”
Here, the city in question does
not qualify as a “political
subdivision” under the plain
language of the statute. Nor
does the city qualify as “the
State,” because Congress
intended to exclude “purely
local matters” from the Act’s
ambit. 
Dougherty
Cty. Bd. of
Educ. v.
White, 439
U.S. 32 (1978)
Majority
(concurring)
The board of
education
qualified as a
“political
subdivision” under
§ 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, and
the rules
governing leave
for employee
candidates
constituted a
“standard,
practice, or
procedure”
requiring federal
preclearance.
In a brief concurrence, Justice
Stevens reiterated his views
from United States v. Board of
Commissioners of Sheffield
that the Court had read the
Voting Rights Act too broadly.
Nonetheless, given stare
decisis, Justice Stevens joined
the Court’s opinion.
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Holt Civic
Club v. City of
Tuscaloosa,
439 U.S. 60
(1978)
Majority
(concurring)
Residents of an
unincorporated
community do not
have a right to
participate in the
political processes
of a city merely
because the State
subjects these
residents to the
city’s jurisdiction.
Justice Stevens agreed with
the majority, though he wrote
separately to emphasize “that
this holding does not make all
exercises of extraterritorial
authority by a municipality
immune from attack” under
the Constitution. The present
attack failed because the
extraterritorial residents did
not have a relationship with
the city such that they would
have an “equally effective”
voice in the city’s political
processes as residents of the
municipality. 
Ill. State Bd.
of Elecs. v.
Socialist
Workers
Party, 440
U.S. 173
(1979)
Separate
opinion
(concurring
in part and
concurring in
the
judgment)
A state statute
requiring
independent
candidates and
new political
parties to obtain
more than 25,000
signatures from
one particular
metropolitan area
to be placed on the
statewide ballot
violates the Equal
Protection Clause. 
Justice Stevens thought the
State had a valid interest in
limiting access to the ballot to
“serious candidates,” and he
did not think rules
differentiating between
political offices violated the
Equal Protection Clause. “The
constitutional requirement
that [the State] govern
impartially would be
implicated by a rule that
discriminates, for example,
between Socialists and
Republicans or between
Catholics and Protestants. But
I question whether it has any
application to rules
prescribing different
qualifications for different
political offices.”
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Marchioro v.
Chaney, 442
U.S. 191
(1979)
Majority
(author)
A state statute
requiring each
major political
party to have a
State Committee
consisting of two
persons from each
county did not
violate the parties’
associational
rights under the
First Amendment.
“The State’s interest in
ensuring that [the process of
selecting and electing
candidates] is conducted in a
fair and orderly fashion is
unquestionably legitimate; ‘as
a practical matter, there must
be a substantial regulation of
elections if they are to be fair
and honest and if some sort of
order, rather than chaos, is to
accompany the democratic
process.’”
City of Rome
v. United
States, 446
U.S. 156
(1980)
Majority
(concurring)
The Voting Rights
Act does not
provide a “bail
out” measure for
municipalities or
localities if the
entire State falls
within the
preclearance
system. Congress
validly enacted a
statewide remedy
under § 2 of the
Fifteenth
Amendment even
absent an express
discriminatory
purpose.
Congress could validly impose
a statewide remedy. Imposing
a statewide remedy gave
Congress the authority to
regulate municipalities that
had no history of
discriminatory practices. 
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City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55 (1980)
Majority
(concurring
in the
judgment)
Concerning
multimember
legislative
districts, facially
neutral actions are
unconstitutional
only if motivated
by discriminatory
purposes.
“[A] political decision that is
supported by valid and
articulable justifications
cannot be invalid simply
because some participants in
the decisionmaking process
were motivated by a purpose
to disadvantage a minority
group.”
McDaniel v.
Sanchez, 452
U.S. 130
(1981)
Majority
(author)
A reapportionment
plan submitted by
a local legislative
body of a
jurisdiction
covered by the
Voting Rights Act
in a response to a
judicial
determination
that the existing
apportionment of
its electoral
districts is
unconstitutional
must comply with
the preclearance
requirement of § 5
of the Act.
“The preclearance procedure is
designed to forestall the
danger that local decisions to
modify voting practices will
impair minority access to the
electoral process. The federal
interest in preventing local
jurisdictions from making
changes that adversely affect
the rights of minority voters is
the same whether a change is
required to remedy a
constitutional violation or is
merely the product of a
community’s perception of the
desirability of responding to
new social patterns.”
2018] A VOICE IN THE WILDERNESS 409
FEC v.
Democratic
Senatorial
Campaign
Comm., 454
U.S. 27 (1981)
Majority
(concurring
in the
judgment)
The Federal
Election
Campaign Act
does not foreclose
a state committee
of a political party
from designating
the national
senatorial
campaign
committee of that
party as its agent
for making
expenditures
allowed by the
Act, and,
accordingly, the
FEC acted within
its proper
authority when it
determined to
permit such
agency
agreements.
“[I]t would appear to me to
follow almost automatically
that the NRSC may act as an
agent for the state committees
in spending the amounts that
state committees are
authorized to spend ... since
state committees are largely
controlled by the state
candidates that they serve.”
Clements v.
Fashing, 457
U.S. 957
(1982)
Separate
opinion
(concurring
in part and
concurring in
the
judgment)
A provision in a
state constitution
that renders an
officeholder
ineligible for the
state legislature if
his current term
will not expire
until after the
legislative term to
which he aspires
(“resign-or-run”)
does not violate
the Equal
Protection Clause.
Justice Stevens would not
start the Court’s analysis with
the appropriate level of
scrutiny. Instead, Justice
Stevens suggests that “a
better starting point may be a
careful identification of the
character of the federal
interest in equality that is
implicated by the State’s
discriminatory classification.”
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Rogers v.
Lodge, 458
U.S. 613
(1982)
Dissent
At-large election
system employed
by the county
impermissibly
dilutes the voting
strength of African
Americans.
While agreeing with the Court
substantively, Justice Stevens
nevertheless “believe[d] the
Court err[ed] by holding the
structure of the local
governmental unit
unconstitutional without
identifying an acceptable,
judicially manageable
standard for adjudicating
cases of this kind....
[C]onstitutional adjudication
that is premised on a case-by-
case appraisal of the
subjective intent of local
decisionmakers cannot
possibly satisfy the
requirement of impartial
administration of the law that
is embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”
Anderson v.
Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780
(1983)
Majority
(author)
Ohio’s early filing
deadline for
candidates
burdened
independent-
minded candidates
without a
sufficiently
weighty state
justification.
When state laws burden the
right to vote, courts must first
“consider the character and
magnitude of the asserted
injury.” Then, courts must
“identify and evaluate the
precise interests put forward
by the State as justifications
for the burdens imposed by its
rule.” Finally, the courts must
then weigh the two categories
against each other.
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Karcher v.
Daggett, 462
U.S. 725
(1983)
Majority
(concurring)
Redistricting
disparities that
“were not the
result of a good-
faith effort to
achieve population
equality” violate
the Fourteenth
Amendment even
when the
disparities are
only marginal.
Redistricting plans that
feature any deviation from
equality without a sufficient
compelling state justification
cannot stand. In this
concurrence, Justice Stevens
first expressed his hostility to
partisan gerrymandering and
how such plans are not
justified under the one person,
one vote principle. 
McCain v.
Lybrand, 465
U.S. 236
(1984)
Majority
(author)
Preclearance of a
covered
jurisdiction
through the
United States
Attorney General
under the Voting
Rights Act
requires
unambiguity.
Making the
Attorney General
aware of an
electoral change is
not sufficient.
“The preclearance process is
by design a stringent one; it is
predicated on the
congressional finding that
there is a risk that covered
jurisdictions may attempt to
circumvent the protections
afforded by the Act ...
submissions under the
alternative preclearance
method ... should be carefully
construed to protect the
remedial aims of the Act.”
412 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:335
Miss.
Republican
Exec. Comm.
v. Brooks, 469
U.S. 1002
(1984)
Majority
(concurring)
Summary
affirmance. 
Justice Stevens wrote
separately to address Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent. Namely,
Justice Stevens thought that
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent did
not fairly categorize the
questions presented in the
parties’ briefs. Additionally,
Justice Stevens felt that the
District Court had adequately
considered the totality of the
circumstances regarding vote
dilution. 
FEC v. Nat’l
Conservative
Political
Action
Comm., 470
U.S. 480
(1985)
Separate
opinion
(concurring
in part and
dissenting in
part)
The Presidential
Election
Campaign Fund
gave exclusive
standing to the
Federal Election
Commission.
Nonetheless, the
portion of the Act
that prohibited
independent
“political
committees” from
expending more
than $1,000 to
further a
candidate’s
election violates
the First
Amendment.
Justice Stevens concurred
with the majority concerning
the unconstitutionality of the
Act’s prohibition on
independent expenditures. He
dissented on the grounds that
the Court had no need to
decide the standing issue. 
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Tashjian v.
Republican
Party of
Conn., 479
U.S. 208
(1986)
Dissenting
A state’s closed
primary system
impermissibly
interfered with a
political party’s
First Amendment
right to define its
own associational
boundaries.
Further, a party
rule permitting
unaffiliated voters
to participate in
primary elections
does not violate
the Qualifications
Clause.
The plain language of the
Qualifications Clause requires
that voters in federal elections
“shall have” the qualifications
of voters in elections to the
state legislature. Because
state law allowed only
affiliated voters to vote in
primary elections for the state
legislature, the plain language
of the Qualifications Clause
thus required that only
affiliated voters could vote in
primary elections for federal
offices.
Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986)
Separate
opinion
(concurring
in part and
dissenting in
part)
Plaintiffs claiming
impermissible vote
dilution must
demonstrate that
“electoral devices”
resulted in
unequal access to
the electoral
process. 
Justice Stevens would have
deferred more to the District
Court’s findings: “I cannot say
that the District Court,
composed of local judges who
are well acquainted with the
political realities of the State,
clearly erred in concluding
that use of a multimember
electoral structure has caused
black voters in [a particular
district] to have less
opportunity than white voters
to elect representatives of
their choice.”
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Meyer v.
Grant, 486
U.S. 414
(1988)
Majority
(author)
A statute that
penalizes a person
who pays someone
to circulate ballot
petitions does not
survive exacting
scrutiny under the
First Amendment.
“Legislative restrictions on
advocacy of the election or
defeat of political candidates
are wholly at odds with the
guarantees of the First
Amendment. That principle
applies equally to the
discussion of political policy
generally or advocacy of the
passage or defeat of
legislation.”
Eu v. S.F.
Cty.
Democratic
Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 214
(1989)
Majority
(concurring)
Complex state
laws that
governed the
internal affairs of
political parties,
including a ban on
the political
parties’ ability to
endorse primary
candidates,
violated the
parties’ free
associational
rights under the
First Amendment.
Echoing an earlier opinion of
Justice Blackmun, Justice
Stevens expressed his
discomfort with “tests [with]
such easy phrases as
‘compelling [state] interest’
and ‘least drastic [or
restrictive] means.’”
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Austin v.
Mich.
Chamber of
Commerce,
494 U.S. 652
(1990)
Majority
(concurring)
A state statute
prohibiting
corporations from
making
independent
expenditures in
support of political
candidates from
their general
treasuries was
narrowly tailored
because the act
did not impose an
absolute ban on all
forms of corporate
political spending. 
Justice Stevens wrote
separately to express his view
that the distinction between
contributions and independent
expenditures should have
little weight when applied to
corporations. For Justice
Stevens, the danger of either
the fact or even the
appearance of quid pro quo
corruption justified limits on
corporate expenditures and
contributions. 
Chisom v.
Roemer, 501
U.S. 380
(1991)
Majority
(author)
State supreme
court elections fall
within the ambit
of § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. 
Justice Stevens provides some
insight into his view on
judges, stating that “ideally
public opinion should be
irrelevant to the judge’s role
because the judge is so often
called upon to disregard, or
even to defy, popular
sentiment.” He quotes a
publication from his pre-Court
years: “Financing a campaign,
soliciting votes, and
attempting to establish
charisma or name
identification are, at the very
least, unseemly for judicial
candidates because it is the
business of judges to be
indifferent to popularity.”
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Hous.
Lawyer’s
Ass’n v. Att’y
Gen. of Texas,
501 U.S. 419
(1991)
Majority
(author)
The vote dilution
provisions in § 2 of
the Voting Rights
Act applies to the
election of state
trial judges.
“It is equally clear, in our
opinion, that the coverage of
the Act encompasses the
election of executive officers
and trial judges whose
responsibilities are exercised
independently in an area
coextensive with the districts
from which they are elected.”
McCormick v.
United States,
500 U.S. 257
(1991)
Dissenting
Quid pro quo is
necessary for a
conviction under
the Hobbs Act
when an official
receives campaign
contributions,
regardless of that
contribution’s
legitimacy.
Justice Stevens thought using
the language of quid pro quo
confused the issue. For
Stevens, the crime occurs
when the official accepts the
money, regardless of whether
that official later supports the
legislation in question. 
Renne v.
Geary, 501
U.S. 312
(1991)
Majority
(concurring)
A challenge
against a statute
barring political
parties from
endorsing
candidates for
nonpartisan offices
did not present a
ripe case or
controversy. 
Justice Stevens agreed with
the majority. In addition to the
ripeness issue, Justice Stevens
also felt perturbed at “whether
a facial overbreadth challenge
may be construed to have been
made [here]” and whether the
injury in question was even
redressable. 
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Burson v.
Freeman, 504
U.S. 191
(1992)
Dissenting
A state statute
prohibiting the
solicitation of
votes and the
display or
distribution of
campaign
materials within
100 feet of the
entrance to a
polling place
survives strict
scrutiny.
Unlike the majority, Justice
Stevens did not find that the
state had a sufficiently
compelling justification in
enacting the buffer zone. “We
have never regarded tradition
as a proxy for necessity where
necessity must be
demonstrated. To the
contrary, our election-law
jurisprudence is rich with
examples of traditions that,
though longstanding, were
later held to be unnecessary.” 
Presley v.
Etowah Cty.
Comm’n, 502
U.S. 491
(1992)
Dissenting
Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act
does not cover
changes other
than changes in
the rules
governing voting.
Justice Stevens felt that the
Court had historically
construed § 5 to cover the
reallocation of decision-
making authority. Responding
to the majority’s fears of
opening Pandora’s box with
wide coverage, Justice Stevens
proposed a new test based on
the facts of the case: “I would
hold that the reallocation of
decisionmaking authority of
an elective office that is taken
(1) after the victory of a black
candidate, and (2) after the
entry of a consent decree
designed to give black voters
an opportunity to have
representation on an elective
body, is covered by § 5.”
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United States
Dep’t of
Comm. v.
Montana, 503
U.S. 442
(1992)
Majority
(author)
First, Congress’s
apportionment of
congressional
districts among
the states presents
a justiciable issue.
Second, a federal
statute requiring
“method of equal
proportions” to
determine
representation did
not violate the
constitutional
requirement of
apportionment
according to
“respective
numbers.”
“[A]lthough common sense
supports a test requiring a
good faith effort to achieve
precise mathematical equality
within each State, the
constraints imposed by Article
I, § 2 itself make that goal
illusory for the Nation as a
whole.”
Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630
(1993)
Dissenting
A redistricting
scheme violates
the Fourteenth
Amendment if it is
“so bizarre on its
face that it is
unexplainable on
grounds other
than race”—even
if the scheme
benefits racial
minorities.
Justice Stevens dissented
because he thought that a
racial gerrymander did not
violate the Constitution when
the State was attempting to
enhance the strength of a
minority. “I believe that the
Equal Protection Clause is
violated when the State
creates the kind of uncouth
district boundaries ... for the
sole purpose of making it more
difficult for members of a
minority group to win an
election.”
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FEC v. NRA
Political
Victory Fund,
513 U.S. 88
(1994)
Dissenting
The Federal
Election
Committee may
not independently
file a petition for
certiorari with the
Supreme Court,
and the Solicitor
General’s after-
the-fact
authorization of
the filing did not
relate back so as
to make the filing
timely. 
Against the backdrop of the
Watergate scandal’s history,
Justice Stevens thought that
the Court should read the
Federal Election Commission’s
powers broadly. Congress
empowered the Commission to
“appeal” cases, and Justice
Stevens thought that this
language encompassed more
than the narrow reading of
mandatory appeals only. 
Holder v.
Hall, 512 U.S.
874 (1994)
Separate
opinion
The plurality
stated that, where
there is no
objective and
workable standard
for choosing a
reasonable
benchmark by
which to evaluate
a challenged
voting practice,
the voting practice
cannot be
challenged as
dilutive under § 2
of the Voting
Rights Act. 
Justice Stevens wrote
separately to respond to
Justice Thomas who, in a
separate opinion from the
plurality, suggested that the
terms “standard, practice, or
procedure” in the Voting
Rights Act should be restricted
to only practices that affect
ballot access. Justice Stevens
noted that the Court had
consistently construed the
Voting Rights Act broadly, and
Congress, aware of the
expansive construction, had
repeatedly reauthorized the
Act.
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McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334
(1995)
Majority
(author)
A state statute
prohibiting the
distribution of
anonymous
political campaign
literature does not
survive exacting
scrutiny under the
First Amendment.
“Under our Constitution,
anonymous pamphleteering is
not a pernicious, fraudulent
practice, but an honorable
tradition of advocacy and of
dissent. Anonymity is a shield
from the tyranny of the
majority.”
Miller v.
Johnson, 515
U. S. 900
(1995). 
Dissenting
A redistricting
map violates the
Equal Protection
Clause when race
was the
“predominant
factor motivating
the legislature’s
decision to place a
significant number
of voters within or
without a
particular
district.”
Justice Stevens believed that
the plaintiffs, white voters, did
not have standing to bring the
claim because they suffered no
cognizable injury in a map
that served the interest of
promoting minority
representation. “I do not see
how a districting plan that
favors a politically weak group
can violate equal protection.
The Constitution does not
mandate any form of
proportional representation,
but it certainly permits a
State to adopt a policy that
promotes fair representation
of different groups.”
United States
Term Limits,
Inc. v.
Thornton, 514
U.S. 779
(1995)
Majority
(author)
States may not
impose
qualifications for
federal office
beyond those
established by the
Constitution.
“[T]he Framers understood the
Elections Clause as a grant of
authority to issue procedural
regulations, and not as a
source of power to dictate
electoral outcomes, to favor or
disfavor a class of candidates,
or to evade important
constitutional restraints.” 
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U.S. v. Hays,
515 U.S. 737
(1995)
Majority
(concurring
in the
judgment)
Plaintiffs lack
standing to
challenge a
redistricting map;
plaintiffs cannot
demonstrate a
personalized
injury. Racial
gerrymandering
claims cannot
simply be brought
by “anybody in the
State.”
Although Justice Stevens
agreed that the plaintiffs
lacked standing, he did so on
separate grounds. Unlike the
majority, which focused on the
injury component, Justice
Stevens stated that the
plaintiffs lacked standing
because they had failed to
allege and prove vote dilution. 
Colo.
Republican
Fed. Camp.
Comm. v.
FEC, 518 U.S.
604 (1996)
Dissenting
Limits on
expenditures
made by a political
party without
consultation with
the candidate
violate the parties’
rights under the
First Amendment.
“In my opinion, all money
spent by a political party to
secure the election of its
candidate for the office of
United States Senator should
be considered a ‘contribution’
to his or her campaign.”
Morse v.
Republican
Party of Va.,
517 U.S. 186
(1996)
Plurality
(author)
A fee imposed on
delegates to a
political party
convention
impermissibly
undercut
delegates’
influence on the
field of candidates
whose names
appeared on the
ballot and thus
weakened the
effectiveness of
votes cast in the
general election.
Justice Stevens found that the
fee imposed during the
primary process fell within § 5
of the Voting Rights Act.
Because the party did not seek
preclearance, imposition of the
fee violated the Act.
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Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U.S. 899
(1996)
Dissenting
Voters who live in
an allegedly
gerrymandered
district have
standing to
challenge that
district, while
voters who did not
reside in that
district and lacked
evidence that they
were assigned to
their district on
the basis of race
lacked standing.
“A majority’s attempt to
enable the minority to
participate more effectively in
the process of democratic
government should not be
viewed with the same hostility
that is appropriate for
oppressive and exclusionary
abuses of political power.”
Bush v. Vera,
517 U.S. 952
(1996)
Dissenting
Substantial
evidence
demonstrated that
race led to the
neglect of
traditional
districting criteria,
and the districts
exhibited a level of
racial
manipulation in
violation of the
Fourteenth
Amendment.
“By minimizing the critical
role that political motives
played in the creation of these
districts, I fear that the Court
may inadvertently encourage
this more objectionable use of
power in the redistricting
process. Legislatures and
elected representatives have a
responsibility to behave in a
way that incorporates the
elements of legitimacy and
neutrality that must always
characterize the performance
of the sovereign’s duty to
govern impartially.... If any
lines ... are worth
straightening, it is those that
were twisted to exclude, not
those altered to include.”
2018] A VOICE IN THE WILDERNESS 423
Timmons v.
Twin Cities
Area New
Party, 520
U.S. 351
(1997)
Dissenting
State laws
prohibiting
candidates from
appearing on the
ballot as a
candidate for two
political parties
(antifusion laws)
are sufficiently
justified by the
state’s interest in
ballot integrity
and political
stability.
Stability of the two-party
system does not qualify as a
sufficient state interest.
Rather, “a central theme of
our jurisprudence [is] that the
entire electorate ... will benefit
from robust competition in
ideas and governmental
policies that ‘is at the core of
our electoral process.’”
Reno v.
Bossier Par.
Sch. Bd., 520
U.S. 471
(1997)
Primarily a
dissent
(concurring
in part and
dissenting in
part)
Under the Voting
Rights Act, vote
dilution alone is
not sufficient to
prevent
preclearance
under § 5.
However, vote
dilution may
demonstrate an
intent to
retrogress
minority voting
strength, which
would constitute
grounds to deny
preclearance.
Justice Stevens would have
found that vote dilution
violating § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act would constitute
grounds to deny preclearance
per se under § 5.
424 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:335
Ark. Educ.
Television
Comm’n v.
Forbes, 523
U.S. 666
(1998)
Dissenting
A political debate
broadcast
constitutes a
nonpublic forum,
meaning
candidates can be
excluded in a
reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral
way. Generating
no appreciable
public interest is
valid grounds to
exclude such a
candidate.
Justice Stevens did not
dispute the majority’s view
that a broadcast company does
not have an obligation to allow
every candidate access to a
debate. In this particular case,
however, Justice Stevens
found the broadcast company’s
decision unreasonably ad hoc
and done in a manner to
entrench the two major
political parties.
Dep’t of
Commerce v.
U.S. House of
Reps., 525
U.S. 316
(1999)
Dissenting
Voters
demonstrated
sufficient injury
for standing to sue
the Department of
Commerce,
seeking an
injunction against
statistical
sampling for the
upcoming
decennial census. 
Although Justice Stevens
agreed with the majority on
the standing issue, he
disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion on the use of
statistical sampling. The
Census Act, to Justice
Stevens, unambiguously
authorized the Secretary of
Commerce to use sampling
procedures.
Hunt v.
Cromartie,
526 U.S. 541
(1999)
Majority
(concurring)
Genuine issues
about whether a
state legislature
drew a
redistricting plan
with
impermissible
racial motives
precludes
summary
judgment. 
In his concurrence, Justice
Stevens reiterated his views
that an “uncouth” shape
provides strong evidence that
either political or racial factors
motivated the map’s
architects. 
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Rice v.
Cayetano, 528
U.S. 495
(2000)
Dissenting
An electoral
provision
predicating the
franchise on
ancestry
constitutes an
impermissible
racial definition
under the
Fifteenth
Amendment.
Justice Stevens drew parallels
with the Court’s treatment of
Indians, wherein the Court
has allowed Congress to single
out Indians as part of
Congress’s plenary authority.
That authority should also
extend to “native Hawaiians”
as defined by the statute in
question.
Cal.
Democratic
Party v.
Jones, 530
U.S. 567
(2000)
Dissenting
A state law
providing for
blanket primary
elections
impermissibly
violates political
parties’
associational
rights under the
First Amendment.
“A State’s power to determine
how its officials are to be
elected is a quintessential
attribute of sovereignty. This
case is about the State of
California’s power to decide
who may vote in an election
conducted, and paid for, by the
State.”
Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98
(2000)
Dissenting
In a statewide vote
recount, “clear
intent of the voter”
is an insufficient
standard, in
violation of the
Equal Protection
Clause, to recount
votes.
Although “clear intent of the
voter” is vague, Justice
Stevens nonetheless professed
confidence in state judges to
make the judgment calls
inherent to impartial
governance. The Supreme
Court should not have
intervened in an internal state
matter.
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Nixon v.
Shrink Mo.
Gov’t PAC,
528 U.S. 377
(2000)
Majority
(concurring)
State statute
limiting
contributions to
various political
offices is narrowly
tailored, even
though the limits
imposed were
lower than those
in Buckley v.
Valeo.
Justice Stevens agreed with
the majority. He wrote
separately to specifically
address the issues raised by
Justice Kennedy in dissent.
Kennedy suggested that the
Court review its entire
constitutional framework for
campaign finance. In response,
Justice Stevens stated:
“Money is property; it is not
speech.” Government can
impose modest regulations on
property. Accordingly, using
the First Amendment as a
vehicle to strike down
campaign finance laws would
be no different than the
Court’s substantive due
process decisions.
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Cook v.
Gralike, 531
U.S. 510
(2001)
Majority
(author)
A requirement
that candidates
who refused to
support a term
limit provision
have that noted on
the ballot was
unconstitutional.
The States may
regulate the
incidents of
elections to the
federal Congress
only within the
exclusive
delegation of
power under the
Elections Clause,
and a state law
favoring
candidates willing
to support
particular policy
points does not fall
within this
delegation.
Justice Stevens reiterated the
views he set out in United
States Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton: dictating an
electoral outcome does not
qualify as a procedural
mechanism authorized by the
Elections Clause. 
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Republican
Party of Minn.
v. White, 536
U.S. 765
(2002)
Dissenting
A state law
preventing judicial
candidates from
announcing views
on disputed
political and legal
issues violates the
First Amendment.
The prohibition
was not narrowly
tailored to serve
impartiality in the
traditional sense,
where impartiality
meant open-
mindedness.
“By obscuring the
fundamental distinction
between campaigns for the
judiciary and the political
branches, and by failing to
recognize the difference
between statements made in
articles or opinions and those
made on the campaign trail,
the Court defies any sensible
notion of the judicial office and
the importance of impartiality
in that context.”
Branch v.
Smith, 538
U.S. 254
(2003)
Separate
opinion
(concurring
in part and
concurring in
the
judgment)
Absent evidence
that a State will
fail timely to
perform its
congressional
redistricting duty,
federal courts
must neither
affirmatively
obstruct state
redistricting nor
permit federal
litigation to
impede it. 
Justice Stevens believed that
Congress had implicitly
banned at-large elections, and,
as such, had preempted the
state from statutorily
authorizing at-large elections.
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McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S.
93 (2003)
Majority
(opinion
coauthor)
The “soft money”
ban in the
Bipartisan
Campaign Reform
Act does not
violate the First
Amendment.
Similar
prohibitions on the
source, content,
and timing of
political
advertisements do
not run afoul of
the Constitution.
In a joint opinion with Justice
O’Connor, Justice Stevens
expressed the view that
“money, like water, always
finds an outlet.” Accordingly,
the government has a
compelling interest in taking
measures to combat “both the
actual corruption threatened
by large financial
contributions and ... the
appearance of corruption.”
Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 317
(2004) 
Dissenting
There are
presently no
judicially
manageable
standards to
adjudicate claims
of partisan
gerrymandering.
“In my view, the same
standards should apply to
claims of political
gerrymandering, for the
essence of a gerrymander is
the same regardless of
whether the group is identified
as political or racial.”
Cox v. Larios,
542 U.S. 947
(2004)
Majority
(concurring)
The Supreme
Court summarily
affirmed a
judgment holding
that Georgia’s
state redistricting
plan violated the
one person, one
vote principle by
deliberately
favoring rural and
inner city
interests.
Justice Stevens wrote a
separate concurring opinion to
note his view that providing a
standard for partisan
gerrymanders in Vieth v.
Jubelirer would have made
the case stronger. “Drawing
district lines that have no
neutral justification in order
to place two incumbents of the
opposite party in the same
district is probative of ...
impermissible intent.”
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Spencer v.
Pugh, 543
U.S. 1301
(2004)
Order for the
Court as
Circuit
Justice
Sitting as Circuit
Justice to review
an Election Eve
petition to prevent
the Ohio
Republican Party
from sending
challengers to the
polls, Justice
Stevens denied the
request.
“Practical considerations, such
as the difficulty of digesting all
of the relevant filings and
cases, and the challenge of
properly reviewing all of the
parties’ submissions as a full
Court in the limited timeframe
available, weigh heavily
against granting the
extraordinary type of relief
requested here. Moreover, I
have faith that the elected
officials and numerous
election volunteers on the
ground will carry out their
responsibilities in a way that
will enable qualified voters to
cast their ballots.”
Clingman v.
Beaver, 544
U.S. 581
(2005)
Dissenting
A semiclosed
primary system
(open only to party
members and
independent
voters) only
minimally burdens
voters’
associational
rights; the state
has sufficient
justifications in
preserving
political parties,
enhancing parties’
electioneering and
party-building
efforts, and
guarding against
party raiding.
“States do not have a valid
interest in manipulating the
outcome of elections, in
protecting the major parties
from competition, or in
stunting the growth of new
parties.”
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League of
United Latin
Am. Citizens
v. Perry, 548
U.S. 399
(2006)
Separate
opinion
(concurring
in part and
dissenting in
part)
The state’s
redistricting plan
did not violate the
Constitution, but
part of the plan
violated the
Voting Rights Act.
One district had
been redrawn in
such a way as to
deny Latino voters
as a group the
opportunity to
elect a candidate
of their choosing,
thereby violating
the Voting Rights
Act.
Justice Stevens agreed that
one district had been drawn in
such a way as to violate the
principles of racial
gerrymandering. However, he
would have found the entire
plan invalid as a partisan
gerrymander, reiterating his
position in Vieth v. Jubelirer.
Randall v.
Sorrell, 548
U.S. 230
(2006)
Dissenting
A state statute
restricting
campaign
expenditure
amounts cannot
place substantial
restrictions on the
ability of
candidates to raise
the funds
necessary to run a
competitive
election, on the
ability of political
parties to help
their candidates
electoral chances,
or on the ability of
individual citizens
to volunteer their
time to campaigns.
“I am convinced that Buckley’s
holding on expenditure limits
is wrong, and that the time
has come to overrule it.”
Because the plurality relied
largely on Buckley, Justice
Stevens rejected the
plurality’s argument.
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Purcell v.
Gonzalez, 549
U.S. 1 (2006)
Majority
(concurring)
In a challenge to a
state voter
identification law,
the Ninth Circuit
did not
appropriately
defer to the
District Court’s
findings; the
election should
proceed without
an injunction on
the voter
identification law.
“At least two important
factual issues remain largely
unresolved: the scope of the
disenfranchisement that the
novel identification
requirements will produce,
and the prevalence and
character of the fraudulent
practices that allegedly justify
those requirements. Given the
importance of the
constitutional issues, the
Court wisely takes action that
will enhance the likelihood
that they will be resolved
correctly on the basis of
historical facts rather than
speculation.”
Crawford v.
Marion Cty.
Election Bd.,
553 U.S. 181
(2008)
Plurality
(author)
The slight burden
imposed on voters
by the state’s
photo
identification
requirement does
not outweigh the
state’s legitimate
interest in
combating voter
fraud.
Justice Stevens largely
deferred to the state, crediting
the state’s strong interests in
combating voter fraud as
compared to the more minimal
burdens, according to the
record, that the voter
identification law imposed on
individual voters. 
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Riley v.
Kennedy, 553
U.S. 406
(2008)
Dissenting
To determine
whether an
election practice
constitutes a
“change” requiring
preclearance
under the Voting
Rights Act, the
practice must be
compared with the
covered
jurisdiction’s
“baseline”—the
most recent
practice both
precleared and “in
force or effect.” A
challenge to a law
under the state
judicial system
prevented the law
from being “in
force or effect.”
The Supreme Court must give
the Voting Rights Act the
broadest possible scope.
Accordingly, even a state court
decision altering a voting
procedure requires
preclearance under the Act.
N.Y. State Bd.
of Elections v.
Lopez Torres,
552 U.S. 196
(2008)
Majority
(concurring)
A political party’s
associational
rights do not
confer any
associational right
on individual
candidates.
Candidates do not
have an
associational right
to have a degree of
influence over a
political party or
to a “fair shot” at
the party’s
nomination. 
Justice Stevens agreed with
the majority. He wrote
separately merely to quote
former Justice Thurgood
Marshall: “The Constitution
does not prohibit legislatures
from enacting stupid laws.”
While the challenged primary
system passed constitutional
muster, Justice Stevens
reflected that the Court’s
opinion should not be misread
as endorsement of the
electoral system.
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Davis v. FEC,
554 U.S. 724
(2008)
Primarily a
dissent
(concurring
in part and
dissenting in
part)
The “Millionaire’s
Amendment” to
the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform
Act, which raised
contribution limits
for candidates
running against
self-funded
candidates,
violated the First
Amendment.
Justice Stevens thought the
Millionaire’s Amendment did
not impose any burdens on
speech and actually generated
more speech by raising
contribution limitations. “[W]e
have long recognized the
strength of an independent
governmental interest in
reducing both the influence of
wealth on the outcomes of
elections, and the appearance
that wealth alone dictates
those results.” The
Millionaire’s Amendment
validly achieved those goals.
Citizens
United v.
FEC, 558 U.S.
310 (2010)
Primarily a
dissent
(concurring
in part and
dissenting in
part)
Under the First
Amendment
corporate funding
of independent
political
broadcasts in
candidate
elections cannot be
limited.
Essentially, Justice Stevens
did not find that corporations
represented individuals with
the same protections under
the First Amendment.
Accordingly, the government
has a compelling interest in
limiting corporations’
expenditures in the election
process. 
Doe v. Reed,
561 U.S. 186
(2010)
Separate
opinion
(concurring
in part and
concurring in
the
judgment)
The disclosure
requirements of
the Public Records
Act are sufficiently
related to a State’s
interest in
protecting the
integrity of the
electoral process to
survive exacting
scrutiny under the
First Amendment. 
Given the State’s more-than-
adequate justification in
disclosing the information and
the insubstantial burdens
imposed on voters, Justice
Stevens said: “This is not a
hard case.”
